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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2006, the British Serious Fraud Office
(SFO) closed an investigation into a case that has become a
vexing test for the emerging international anti-corruption re-
gime.  The centerpiece of this regime is the Anti-Bribery Con-
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vention negotiated under the auspices of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).1  The
Convention—to which Britain is a party—requires the State
Parties to outlaw overseas bribery.2  In closing the investigation
into corruption involving a large defense procurement con-
tract (dubbed Al Yamamah or “the dove”), the SFO and the
Attorney General cited national security concerns.  The press
release from the SFO is terse.  We quote it in its entirety:
The Director of the Serious Fraud Office has decided
to discontinue the investigation into the affairs of
BAE Systems Plc as far as they relate to the Al
Yamamah defense contract with the government of
Saudi Arabia.  The decision has been taken following
representations that have been made both by the At-
torney General and the Director of the SFO concern-
ing the need to safeguard national and international
security.  It has been necessary to balance the need to
maintain the rule of law against the wider public in-
terest.  No weight has been given to commercial in-
terests or to the national economic interest.3
This Article argues that the British government, by invok-
ing national security as an unexplained justification for quash-
ing a bribery investigation, violated the Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion.  Under U.K. law, the important issue is how exercises of
1. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in In-
ternational Business Transactions, Apr. 18, 1998, 337 I.L.M. 8, 112 Stat.
3302, available at http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,2340,en_2649_2011
85_2017813_1_1_1_1,00.html [hereinafter OECD Convention].
2. Id. art. 1.  The Convention came into force on February 15, 1999 and
has been ratified by thirty-six countries, both Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) members and invited non-members.
For the list of countries, see Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of For-
eign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Ratification Sta-
tus as of 19 June 2007, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/
1898632.pdf.
3. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Serious Fraud Office Statement
(Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/news/prout/pr_497.asp?
seltxt= [hereinafter SFO].  The Attorney General Lord Peter Goldsmith’s
presentation to the House of Lords on Dec. 14, 2006 is in 687 PARL. DEB.,
H.L. (5th Ser.) (2006) 1711-17 (presentation by Att’y Gen. Lord Peter Gold-
smith on the SFO). See also Stephen Fidler, Blair Bows to Pressure on Jobs, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, at 3; David Leigh & Rob Evans, “National Interest” Halts
Arms Corruption Inquiry, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2006, at 1.
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prosecutorial discretion are constrained by treaty obligations.
In this case, failure to prosecute undermines the basic purpose
of the OECD Convention, as agreed on by the treaty partners.
This fact, we argue, should influence exercises of prosecutorial
discretion.4
The main thrust of our analysis, however, concerns the
international law of national security.  The Convention does
not contain an explicit national security exception.  Moreover,
we argue that international law does not authorize states to
read into treaties an implicit open-ended exception.  Many
treaties contain explicit exceptions, but most of these signifi-
cantly constrain the exercise of such exceptions either substan-
tively or procedurally, or both.  Any effort to justify the British
position must come to terms with the multitudinous and con-
strained character of explicit national security exceptions.
We use the British case as a reference point in developing
our larger claims.  The Al Yamamah deal involved the sale of
jet airplanes from the United Kingdom to the Saudi Air Force
with BAE Systems (BAE) as the prime contractor, and it pro-
ceeded in three phases.5  The first, beginning in 1988, called
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. BAE Systems was formed by a merger of British Aerospace and Mar-
coni Electronic Systems.  The links between the U.K. government and BAE
Systems are strong.  First, the U.K. government has a special share in BAE so
that certain provisions in BAE’s Articles of Association can only be changed
with the written consent of the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry.
See Competition Commission, British Aerospace plc and Thompson-CSF SA:
A Report on the Proposed Merger 3 (1991), available at http://www.compe-
tition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/reports/1991/fulltext/296c2.pdf.  The
second link is the Defense Industrial Strategy (DIS) of the U.K. government,
a white paper published on December 15, 2005.  The primary motive of the
DIS is the support of U.K. companies in key defense areas.  According to one
commentator:  “The strategy is aimed at keeping BAE Systems as the coun-
try’s national champion.”  Douglass Barrie, British Defense Industrial Strategy
Secures BAE Systems as U.K. Champion, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Dec. 17,
2005, available at http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.
jsp?channel=awst&id=news/12195p1.xml.  BAE Systems CEO Mike Turner
said of the DIS:  “If we didn’t have the DIS and our profitability and the
terms of trade had stayed as they were . . . then there had to be a question
mark about our future in the U.K.” Id.  The final link pertains to the Al
Yamamah deal itself.  The British group that went to Bermuda to sign the
first agreement included two officials from the Ministry of Defense and a
BAE director.  David Pallister, The Arms Deal They Called the Dove:  How Britain
Grasped the Biggest Prize, GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 2006, at 6.  Under the agreement
between the British and Saudi governments, the Saudis pay for the arma-
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for the sale of 122 jet airplanes and many other types of mili-
tary equipment and the construction of two airbases.  Five
years later, after the U.K. strengthened its anti-bribery legisla-
tion,6 Saudi Arabia agreed to purchase another 48 planes.  In
2003, the SFO began its investigation of the Al Yamamah deal.
In August 2006, BAE agreed to supply an additional 72 planes,
but that agreement was reputedly at risk as a result of the SFO
investigation.  All told, the deal has produced a revenue
stream for BAE of about U.S. $2 billion per year—around $40
billion in total since the first agreement was struck.  Long
before the SFO began its investigation, there were rumors that
BAE, as well as some of its subcontractors, had bribed the
Saudi royal family and government officials in order to obtain
the deal.  The bribes were allegedly concealed by inflating the
price of the goods.7  It was also alleged that BAE maintained a
slush fund worth millions of dollars for use by the Saudi royal
family.8
Although the British government cited national security
concerns as one of the main reasons for ending the investiga-
tion, other observers argued that political and economic mo-
ments in barrels of oil and BAE is then paid by the Ministry of Defense.
Sasha Lilley, BAE System’s Dirty Dealings, CORPWATCH, Nov. 11, 2003, http://
www.corpwatch.org/article.php?id=9008.  The deal has been touted as “Brit-
ain’s biggest sale ever, of anything, to anyone.”  David White & Robert
Mauthner, Britain’s Arms Sale of the Century: The 10 Billion Pounds UK-Saudi
Deal, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 1988, at 7.
6. The act is included in the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act,
2001, c. 24 (Eng.).
7. The contract details are summarized in Pallister, supra note 5. See also R
Michael Robinson, BBC Lifts the Lid on Secret BAE Slush Fund, BBC NEWS, Oct.
5, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3712770.stm; David Leigh &
Rob Evans, BAE Accused of Arms Deal Slush Fund, GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 2003, at
1; David Leigh & Rob Evans, Diplomat Linked to BAE Slush Fund Claims,
GUARDIAN, Sept. 13, 2003, at 2; David Leigh & Rob Evans, BAE Denies Exis-
tence of £20m Slush Fund, GUARDIAN, Sept. 11, 2003, at 6.  Early concerns
about the deal are noted in CATHERINE COURTNEY, TRANSPARENCY INTERNA-
TIONAL, CORRUPTION IN THE OFFICIAL ARMS TRADE 19, 21 (2002), available at
http://www.armstradetreaty.org/docs/transparency.alert.report.pdf.
8. In June 2007 the BBC and The Guardian presented evidence of mas-
sive payments from BAE and the British government to Prince Bandar bin
Sultan, former Saudi ambassador to Washington.  Prince Bandar responded
that the payments had been paid into Saudi government bank accounts. See
David Leigh & Rob Evans, BAE Accused of Secretly Paying £1bn to Saudi Prince,
GUARDIAN, June 7, 2007, at 1; BAE and Saudi Arabia:  The Plot Thickens, ECON-
OMIST, June 9, 2007, at 64.
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tives played a large role.  The Attorney General responded
with the claim that the Saudis had threatened to withdraw in-
telligence help if the case were not dropped; he also asserted
that the case against BAE was weak and not worth pursuing, a
position not explicitly endorsed by the SFO.9  In the House of
Lords debate on the matter, Lord Anthony Lester responded
to the Attorney General by noting that “the government acted
in clear breach of its obligations under the OECD convention
against corruption.”10  Others have questioned the substance
of the national security claims, arguing that the Saudis have no
interest in failing to cooperate with British intelligence.11
We do not try to resolve this continuing controversy.  In-
stead, we use it to motivate our inquiry into the more general
questions raised by state efforts to use national security as:  (1)
the basis of an implied exception in international treaties; and
(2) an argument for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Part II argues that international law does not support ef-
forts to read an implicit national security exception into trea-
ties.  Customary international law contains no such general
presumption; rather, it includes exceptional reasons for dero-
gation that encompass particularly acute security threats that
could undermine a country’s very existence or make compli-
ance impossible or extremely costly.  Many treaties contain ex-
plicit national security exceptions, and these take various
forms tailored to the particular subject at issue.  A general pre-
sumption of an implied national security exception would
have the effect of either writing nuanced or constraining lan-
9. See David Leigh & Richard Norton-Taylor, Lives at Stake If Inquiry Had
Upset Saudis, Says Goldsmith, GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2007, at 4; SFO, supra note 3. R
As a result of the continuing controversy, Attorney General Goldsmith ap-
peared again before the House of Lords on February 1, 2007 for an ex-
tended interchange. See 689 PARL. DEB., H. L. (5th ser.) (2007) 339-83.
10. Anthony Lester, Comment, Lord Goldsmith’s Folly Has Now Been Bru-
tally Exposed, GUARDIAN, Feb. 1, 2007, at 33.  In contrast, the Attorney Gen-
eral was defended by Lord Harry Woolf. See Harry Woolf, Op-Ed., Don’t Abol-
ish the Attorney General, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH, Feb. 4, 2007, at 21.
11. The British intelligence services distanced themselves from Lord
Goldsmith’s claims. See Leigh & Norton-Taylor, supra note 9; Rob Evans, R
Britain Censured over Decision to Drop BAE Saudi Corruption Inquiry, GUARDIAN,
Jan. 19, 2007, at 4. The Economist pointed out in an editorial that the Saudis
needed the assistance of British intelligence at least as much as the United
Kingdom needed help from the Saudis.  Editorial, Arms Deals and Bribery:
The Bigger Bang, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2007, at 15.
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guage out of existing treaties, or, alternatively, of introducing
ambiguity into treaties lacking explicit terms, because it would
not be clear which of the different types of “national security
exception” should be implied.
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has no explicit na-
tional security exception, and article 5 of the treaty states that
investigations shall not be “influenced by considerations of na-
tional economic interest, the potential effect upon relations
with another State or the identity of the natural or legal per-
sons involved.”12  Given this language, there is no basis for im-
plying an open-ended, self-judging national security excep-
tion, and the BAE case does not fall under the customary law
exceptions that involve national security.  We agree, however,
that the U.K. Serious Fraud Office does have discretion under
U.K. law to decide which cases to pursue, and we discuss the
way such discretion can legitimately affect enforcement
choices.
Even if one rejects our first argument and proposes an
implicit national security exception, one would still need to
articulate the substance of such an exception to the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention.  Given that standard doctrines of
customary international law do not provide an answer, one way
to do this would be to examine the explicit exceptions in other
treaties.  Part III examines the diversity of national security ex-
ceptions that are currently written into important treaties.  As
is shown in Part III, treaties vary, and it is unclear which ver-
sion of the exception should be read into the Convention.  Im-
portantly, in spite of this variability, there are both procedural
and substantive limits to explicit exceptions.  These limits
ought to apply a fortiori to implicit exceptions.  A Party cannot
claim that an implicit exception is stronger than commonly
used weaker provisions.  Otherwise, the best way to include a
strong national security exception in a treaty would be simply
to avoid any mention of the issue.  If international law is to
constrain state behavior, this result seems absurd.  The devel-
opment of international law as a set of principled constraints
would be stymied if states could simply assert the existence of a
favorable norm whenever a treaty imposed costs.  If interna-
tional law is to have any bite, states should negotiate over diffi-
12. OECD Convention, supra note 1, art. 5.
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cult issues ex ante rather than leave them to ad hoc and ex
post assertions by interested State Parties.
II. DO ALL TREATIES CONTAIN AN IMPLICIT NATIONAL
SECURITY EXCEPTION?
There is no general international law doctrine establish-
ing an implicit, open-ended national security exception for all
treaties.  We base this conclusion on two arguments.  First, cus-
tomary international law does not contain a national security
exception.  Neither the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) nor the International Law
Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Interna-
tionally Wrongful Acts (“ILC Articles”) contains a national se-
curity exception.13  Moreover, these conventions, both widely
accepted as customary law, place specific limits on the excep-
tions they do include.  These doctrines have been reviewed by
courts and are not left to the unilateral discretion of sovereign
states.  Even when states do exercise discretion, it must be
done in “good faith.”  Second, explicit security exceptions are
commonly included in treaties, but they vary from treaty to
treaty and often within a particular treaty.  Given our conclu-
sion that no implicit exemption exists, we end this Part by re-
turning to the explicit language of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention and its accompanying commentary to consider
the breadth of the allowance for prosecutorial discretion con-
sistent with the aims of that treaty.
A. Customary International Law
Customary international law identifies exceptions that ap-
ply to all treaties, even when not explicitly mentioned.  The
four that are most likely to be invoked in relation to national
security are clausula rebus sic stantibus, the law of reprisal, self-
defense, and the doctrine of necessity.  The first stipulates that
a treaty may become inapplicable due to a fundamental
change of circumstances.  The second permits a party to sus-
13. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 3, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]; Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of
the International Law Commission, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available
at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a5610.pdf [hereinafter ILC
Articles] (Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts).
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pend or terminate a treaty in response to a breach by another
party.  Both of these principles are widely accepted parts of
customary international law and have been codified in the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties.14  The third and
fourth exceptions, the doctrines of necessity and self-defense,
are not codified in the Vienna Convention.  However, they are
recognized by the ILC Articles,15 which have arguably
achieved the status of customary international law.16  They are
frequently incorporated explicitly into treaty language, and in
such cases they are interpreted in the light of customary inter-
national law, not just in terms of the particular treaty in which
they appear.17
14. See Vienna Convention, supra note 13, arts. 60, 62. R
15. See ILC Articles, supra note 13.  Paragraph 76 of this report repro- R
duces all of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, and paragraph 77 contains commentaries on the Draft Arti-
cles.  For clarity, subsequent citations to ILC Articles are by page and article
numbers.  “Established in 1948, the International Law Commission’s man-
date is the progressive development and codification of international law, in
accordance with article 13(1)(a) of the Charter of the United Nations.”  In-
ternational Law Commission, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited Jan.
19, 2008).  The Articles were adopted by the ILC in 2001, and on December
12, 2001 the UN General Assembly “commend[ed] them to the attention of
Governments without prejudice to the question of their future adoption or
other appropriate action.”  Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Jan. 28,
2002).  A similar resolution was adopted in 2004.  G.A. Res. 59/35, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/59/35 (Dec. 16, 2004).  Opinions differ on whether the UN should
attempt to codify these resolutions into a convention. See James Crawford &
Simon Olleson, The Continuing Debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibil-
ity, 54 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 959 (2005).
16. See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Emergency Exceptions to International Obliga-
tions in the Realm of Foreign Investment:  The State of Necessity and Force Majeure as
Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNA-
TIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino & Christoph
Schreuer eds., forthcoming 2008).  Crawford and Olleson summarize the
2004 debate over the ILC Articles in the UN General Assembly.  Some dele-
gates urged codification of the ILC Articles in a convention while others
claimed that they were gradually obtaining the status of customary interna-
tional law and that this trend should be allowed to continue.  The Secretary-
General was requested to compile decisions of international courts that re-
ferred to the ILC Articles in time for an autumn 2007 meeting of the appro-
priate committee of the General Assembly.  Crawford & Olleson, supra note
15, at 965. R
17. See, e.g., BVerfG [Federal Constitutional Court] July 5, 2007, 75/2007
Argentinien-Anleihen:  Staatsnotstand berechtigt nicht zur Zahlung-
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The presence of these and other customary law excep-
tions18 highlights the lack of an implicit national security ex-
ception.  There is no basis to treat such an exception as part of
customary international law over and above the invocation of
existing doctrines that can apply to national security concerns.
The implicit exceptions are tailored to permit states to re-
spond to emergencies and to hostile actions by others.  They
seem quite well-crafted to prevent states from invoking broad,
open-ended national security claims that could undermine
much of international law.
Moreover, when tribunals review state actions, a state can-
not unilaterally invoke even recognized exceptions on the ba-
sis of its own assertion that they apply.  Tribunals generally do
not give states carte blanche to interpret these doctrines as
they wish.  We consider each of the implicit exceptions briefly
to demonstrate this point.
Invoking clausula rebus sic stantibus, or a fundamental
change in circumstances, Iceland challenged the jurisdiction
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Fisheries Juris-
diction Case.19  The ICJ rejected this challenge to its jurisdic-
tion, a separate issue that does not concern us here.  However,
relevant to our inquiry, the ICJ went on to suggest that it
would review a claim of changed circumstance on the merits as
a question of fact:
The Court, at the present stage of the proceedings,
does not need to pronounce on this question of fact, as
to which there appears to be a serious divergence of
views between the two Governments.  If, as con-
tended by Iceland, there have been any fundamental
changes in fishing techniques in the waters around
Iceland, those changes might be relevant for the decision on
sverweigerung gegenu¨ber privaten Gla¨ubigern (F.R.G.) (indicating that the
ILC Articles have the status of customary international law and interpreting
“necessity” in this light).  For a summary of the decision, see Stephen W.
Schill, German Constitutional Court Rules on Necessity in Argentine Bondholder
Case, ASIL INSIGHTS, July 31, 2007, http://asil.org/insights/2007/07/in-
sights070731.html.
18. See, e.g., Vienna Convention, supra note 13, §§ 2, 3 (“Invalidity of R
Treaties” and “Termination and Suspension of the Operation of Treaties”).
19. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 2) (Juris-
diction of the Court), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/
5749.pdf.
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the merits of the dispute, and the Court might need to ex-
amine the contention at that stage . . . .20
The law of reprisal is also subject to limits.  As the Naulilaa
Case21 explains, “reprisals (1) can only be executed by agencies
or instrumentalities of a State; (2) must be proportionate; and
(3) must follow a failed attempt to resolve the violation by
peaceful negotiation.”22  The Vienna Convention requires that
the breach eliciting the response be “material” and defines a
“material breach” as “(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanc-
tioned by the present Convention; or (b) the violation of a
provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or pur-
pose of the treaty.”23  ILC articles 49 through 54 specify addi-
tional limitations on countermeasures that may be taken in re-
sponse to international law violations by other parties.24  Fur-
thermore, UN Charter article 2(4) limits the traditional ability
of states to use force in reprisals.25
The doctrine of necessity is a recognized principle of cus-
tomary international law, but it has been strictly limited by the
ILC Commentary and international tribunals in part because
of the potential for abuse by states eager to avoid treaty obliga-
tions.26  The ILC Commentary states that “necessity will only
rarely be available to excuse non-performance of an obliga-
tion” and “is subject to strict limitations to safeguard against
possible abuse.”27  Bjorklund suggests that “its successful invo-
20. Id. ¶ 40 (emphasis added).  Iceland seems not to have raised the fun-
damental change of circumstances claim at the merits stage.  See generally
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25) (Merits),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/55/5977.pdf.
21. Naulilaa Case, 8 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 409 (Port.-Ger. 1928), reprinted in 2
R. INT’L ARB. AWARDS 1011 (1949).
22. Andrew D. Mitchell, Does One Illegality Merit Another?:  The Law of Bel-
ligerent Reprisals in International Law, 170 MIL. L. REV. 155, 158-59 (2001).
23. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 60(1)-(3). R
24. ILC Articles, supra note 13, arts. 49-54. R
25. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their inter-
national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsis-
tent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
26. The language in article 25 states the customary view.  ILC Articles,
supra note 13, at 49 (art. 25); see August Reinisch, Necessity in International R
Investment Arbitration—An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases?:
Comments on CMS v. Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina, 8 J. WORLD INV. &
TRADE 191 (2007).
27. ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 195 (commentary to article 25). R
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cation is virtually impossible,” at least in the context of interna-
tional investment.28  To invoke a necessity defense successfully,
a state must show that the act in question is “(a) the only way
for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril; and (b) [d]oes not seriously impair an
essential interest of the State or States towards which the obli-
gation exists, or of the international community as a whole.”29
Once these requirements have been satisfied, the state must
show that neither “[t]he international obligation in question
excludes the possibility of invoking necessity,” nor has “[t]he
State . . . contributed to the situation of necessity.”30
As Reinisch argues, the limited nature of the exception is
made clear by its negative formulation.  Necessity may not be
invoked unless certain specific conditions hold.31  These condi-
tions can involve national security, but simply mentioning na-
tional security as an excuse is not sufficient.  Rather, the condi-
tions in article 25 limit the situations in which a state can
equate its national security concerns with necessity.  Of partic-
ular importance to our argument is the ILC Commentary’s
mention of obligations toward “the international community
as a whole.”32  The collective interest in an honest contracting
environment is both a major justification for the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention’s efforts to limit corruption in interna-
tional business dealings33 and a reason to enforce the treaty to
its fullest extent.
The recent case law concerns disputes where necessity is
included as an exception in the treaty language.  Bjorklund
discusses four recent foreign investment cases dealing with the
necessity defense—three cases from the International Centre
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) relating to
the 2001 Argentine economic crisis34 and one ICJ case dealing
28. Bjorklund, supra note 16. R
29. ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 49 (art. 25(1)). R
30. Id. (art. 25(2)).
31. Reinisch, supra note 26, at 30; see also ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 49 R
(art. 25(1)).
32. ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 195 (commentary to article 25). R
33. See generally OECD, Fighting Bribery and Corruption:  Frequently
Asked Questions, http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,3343,en_2649_20
1185_35430226_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2007).
34. CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID (W.
Bank), Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M. 1205, available at
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with a dispute between Hungary and Slovakia relating to a sys-
tem of locks on the Danube River.35  All of the tribunals con-
sidered claims of necessity to be reviewable, and three rejected
the claims.  The language of each treaty provided that either
Party could take “measures necessary for” a list of eventualities,
including public order and security.36  Bjorklund concludes
that “[a]ll tribunals to date” have rejected efforts by states to
judge for themselves whether they have complied with the ex-
ception.”37
As we discuss below, some treaties do give states more lee-
way to define necessity by stating that a Party can take steps
that “it considers necessary”38 and providing that tribunals will
scrutinize these steps only for good faith.39  However, in our
reading, the status of necessity in customary international law
cannot be broader than the narrowest formulations included
in explicit treaty language, and these are clearly neither open-
ended nor entirely self-judging.  On the general proposition
that drafters do not include meaningless language in treaties,
permissive wording would be included in a treaty only if it
were thought necessary to overcome a background presump-
tion against a broad interpretation of the doctrine.  One does
not have to state that a doctrine’s application can be deter-
mined by a Party if it is obvious from customary international
law that that is so.
States sometimes attempt to give self-defense a very broad
interpretation.  However, the ICJ cabined the meaning of self-
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Award.pdf (rejecting neces-
sity); LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID (W. Bank), Case
No. ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 36, available at http://
www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/pdf/09_LGE_Liability_e.pdf (accepting ne-
cessity); Enron Corp. v. Argentina (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID (W. Bank), Case No.
ARB/01/3 (May 22, 2007), available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/
Enron-Award.pdf (following the decision in CMS on necessity).
35. Gabcı´kovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung.-Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25)
(rejecting necessity).
36. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg., Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124, available at http://
www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/argentina_us.pdf [hereinafter
Protection of Investment Treaty].
37. See Bjorklund, supra note 16. R
38. See, e.g., Protection of Investment Treaty, supra note 36, art. 18(2). R
39. See infra Parts III.C and III.F.
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defense in Nicaragua v. United States40 in a way that makes clear
that the term is not self-judging.  The Court first rejected U.S.
arguments that the controversy was not justiciable.41  It then
rejected the U.S. claim that it was acting in self-defense when it
mined Nicaraguan harbors and engaged in other actions de-
signed to destabilize the Nicaraguan regime in the 1980s.  In
denying the United States’ claim, the Court first held that a
successful claim of self-defense, whether individual or collec-
tive, must be in response to an “armed attack.”42  It then held
that a claim of collective self-defense introduces two additional
requirements:  The state allegedly under armed attack must
declare itself to be so threatened, and it must request assis-
tance.43  The Court found that Nicaragua’s activities in El Sal-
vador, Honduras, and Costa Rica did not rise to the level of an
armed attack44 and that when the United States began its activ-
ities none of those countries had declared that they were
under an armed attack or had requested assistance.45
A few other universal exceptions could be invoked in rela-
tion to national security concerns.  These include the doc-
trines of distress,46 impossibility,47 and force majeure.48  The
doctrine of distress is related to that of necessity,49 but oper-
ates on a smaller scale, protecting “lives”50 rather than “essen-
tial interest[s].”51  Likewise, the doctrines of impossibility and
force majeure are similar to necessity and have limited reach.
The latter requires that performance of the obligation be “ma-
terially impossible” as a result of an “irresistible force” or “un-
40. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27) (Merits).  For a discussion of this case, see infra Part III.C and also
see Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 179-99 (Nov. 6) (Merits).
41. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 26-28.
42. Id. at 103-04; see also Oil Platforms, 2003 I.C.J. at 179-99.
43. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 105.
44. Id. at 119-20.
45. Id. at 120-21.  El Salvador did eventually declare itself under armed
attack and formally requested that the United States exercise its right of col-
lective self-defense, but, as the court observed, “this occurred only on a date
much later than the commencement of the United States activities which
were allegedly justified by this request.” Id. at 120.
46. ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 49 (art. 24). R
47. See Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 61. R
48. ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 48 (art. 23). R
49. See Bjorklund, supra note 16. R
50. ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 49 (art. 24(1)). R
51. Id. at 49 (art. 25(1)).
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foreseen event.”52  The Vienna Convention limits the applica-
tion of the impossibility doctrine to situations in which “the
permanent disappearance or destruction of an object indis-
pensable for the execution of a treaty” renders performance
impossible.53  Neither distress nor force majeure can be invoked
if the state invoking the exception has contributed to the situa-
tion, and both relate only to situations where there is no
choice but to breach the obligation.54  Additionally, distress re-
quires that there be “no other reasonable way” to save the lives
in question.55
In short, although a state can invoke a number of custom-
ary international law doctrines in connection with threats to
national security, none of them provide an umbrella for a
broad-based, open-ended national security exception.  Fur-
thermore, even when a state justifies an action by referring to
52. Id. at 48 (art. 23(1)).
53. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 61(1).  The following cases R
accept impossibility or force majeure as legal principles, but then give them
limited reach and reject their application to the cases at hand:  Russian In-
demnity Case (Russ. v. Turk), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 297 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1912); Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser.
A) No. 20/21; Societe´ Commerciale de Belgique, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B)
No. 78.  The court in Russian Indemnity assessed the facts and held that the
Ottoman Empire could not invoke force majeure to relieve itself of repaying
loans despite very serious financial difficulties and “insurrections and wars.”
Russian Indemnity Case, Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at 317-18.  The court in
Serbian Loans and Societe´ Commerciale treat the doctrines of impossibility and
force majeure as equivalent.  In Serbian Loans, the intervention of a world war
did not relieve the Serbian government from obligations to repay calculated
in terms of gold specie.  Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France,
1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20/21, at 39-40.  In Societe´ Commerciale, the Greek
government argued that its budgetary and monetary situation made it “mate-
rially impossible” for it to execute an award.  Societe´ Commerciale de
Belgique, 1939 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 78, at 20.  The PCIJ held that the
Greek government’s claim could not be entertained “if it were regarded as a
plea in defense designed to obtain from the Court a declaration in law to the
effect that the Greek Government is justified, owing to force majeure, in not
executing the awards. . . .” Id. at 21-22.  The Court did not entertain this
claim because it turned on factual matters not before the Court. Id. at 22.
54. ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 48-49 (arts. 23(2), 24(2)); see Bjork- R
lund, supra note 16 (“Necessity involves the element of volition in that a R
State chooses not to comply with its obligation, albeit for good reason,
whereas force majeure involves an inability to comply with the obligation.”);
id. (referring to “situations of distress where the notion of volition is nulli-
fied because the action is necessary to save a life”).
55. ILC Articles, supra note 13, at 49 (art. 24(1)). R
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one of these implicit exceptions, its action is subject to review
in whatever forum is available for resolving disputes under the
treaty in question.  Issues of the relationship between custom-
ary law and a particular treaty are of course more difficult for
treaties, such as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, that do
not include formal enforcement mechanisms.  One can, how-
ever, learn from the decisions of tribunals that interpret these
doctrines in other treaty contexts.  In most cases, the reason-
ing of these decisions is quite general and is not specific to the
treaty in question.  After all, such generality is what is implied
by the claim that a doctrine is “customary.”
B. Explicit Exceptions
Some treaties contain explicit national security excep-
tions, and others do not.  This varied practice suggests that no
widely recognized implicit exception exists, because otherwise
drafters could rely on a common background norm.  Moreo-
ver, different treaties contain very different exceptions.  In-
deed, alternative formulations sometimes occur within the
same treaty.  There is simply no such thing as “the” national
security exception.
Consider a few examples.  Article XXI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contains national se-
curity exceptions, but tailors them to particular substantive
provisions.  It permits a broader exception for the furnishing
of information—considered a secondary duty under the
GATT—than it does for derogations from primary obliga-
tions.56  The North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT), like the GATT, have exceptions that both limit informa-
tion disclosure by a Party if it is “contrary to its essential secur-
ity interests” and permit a Party to take measures “that it con-
siders necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with re-
spect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace
56. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 21, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].  In 1994, the GATT was in-
corporated into the World Trade Organization with no change in this arti-
cle. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M., 1125 (1994); Michael J.
Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law of GATT:  An Analysis of GATT’s Security Excep-
tion, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 558, 582-84 (1990-1991).
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and security, or the protection of its own essential security in-
terests.”57  Although the language in all three documents gives
considerable discretion to the State Party that invokes the ex-
ception, this discretion cannot be bootstrapped into a stronger
implicit exception.  According to the GATT panel in Nicaragua
v. United States (1984) (Nicaragua I), the treaty’s language is a
ceiling rather than a floor.  The panel rejected the United
States’ claim of an implicit national security exception that
would create an exception broader than the explicit text.58
No GATT panel has ever held that an implicit national security
exception prevents a derogation from being a violation.59
The Rome Statute established the International Criminal
Court (ICC) and endowed it with the power to try cases not
being pursued in national courts.60  The ICC has real clout vis
a` vis State Parties, and so one might think that the Parties
would have been particularly eager to draft a broad national
security exception.  The Rome Statute, however, does not con-
tain a blanket exception, but instead only permits states to re-
fuse to provide certain kinds of information on national secur-
ity grounds.  Its drafters did not give treaty adherents a broad
or open-ended right to appeal to an implicit national security
exception.61  Rather, the Rome Statute presumes that a State
Party can only invoke national security by referencing the rec-
ognized customary law doctrines outlined above or through
the particular portions of the treaty that explicitly allow a na-
tional security exception to demands for the provision of infor-
mation.
57. Protection of Investment Treaty, supra note 36, art. 18; see also North R
American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2102, Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M 289 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA] (containing similar provisions).
58. See Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by Nicaragua, United States—Imports of
Sugar from Nicaragua, L/5513, (July 1, 1983) (GATT Doc.) available at http://
www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91010025.pdf; Communication
from Nicaragua, United States—Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua, L/5492 (May
16, 1983), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/
91000408.pdf; Report of the Panel, United States—Imports of Sugar from Nicara-
gua, ¶ 4.4-4.7, L/5607 (Mar. 13, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67, 74
(1984), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/ussu-
garnicaragua.pdf.
59. See infra Part III.A for further discussion of the GATT cases.
60. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
61. See infra Part III.D for further discussion of the Rome Statute.
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Many human rights treaties include national security pro-
visions that vary in language and only apply to particular sec-
tions of the treaty.  The overarching International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains an exception
for national emergencies; it does not presume that such an
exception is an implicit condition.  The ICCPR then goes on
to identify both antidiscrimination norms and seven articles
within the treaty as being nonderogable.62  It establishes a pro-
cess for announcing a public emergency that only justifies par-
ticular derogations and requires the party to give reasons.63
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) also in-
cludes national security exemptions for some, but not all, of
the rights it seeks to protect.64  When national security is in-
voked to limit rights, the restrictions must be “prescribed by
law” and “necessary in a democratic society.”65
Similarly, the conventions dealing with children’s rights,66
62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 4(1)-(2),
Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368 [hereinafter ICCPR].
63. Id. art. 4(3).
64. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 312 E.T.S. 5, available at http://
www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html [hereinafter ECHR].  Articles 6 (fair trial),
8 (respect for private and family life), 9 (freedom of thought conscience and
religion), 10 (freedom of expression), and 11 (right of peaceful assembly
and association) permit national security exceptions.  Articles 2 (right to
life), 3 (prohibition on torture), 4 (prohibition on slavery), 5 (liberty and
security of person), 7 (no punishment without law), and 12 (right to marry)
have no such exceptions.
65. Id. art. 9(2); see also arts. 8(2) (“in accordance with the law” and “nec-
essary in a democratic society”), 10(2) (same as article 9); 11(2) (same as
article 9).  Article 6(1), dealing with the right to a fair trial, permits the press
and the public to be excluded from the trial in a limited class of cases includ-
ing “the interest of national security in a democratic society.” Id. art. 6(1).
66. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3, 28 I.L.M. 1456 [hereinafter CRC].  The CRC has thirty-five substantive
articles, but only three include national security exceptions.  These three
deal with travel by parents and children and children’s freedom of expres-
sion and association. Id. arts. 10(2), 13(2), 15(2).  These rights may be sub-
ject to certain restrictions but only if the restrictions are provided by law and
are necessary for the protection of national security or public order.  Article
15 limits the concept of “necessity” to its meaning in “democratic” societies.
Id. art. 15.
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migrant workers,67 refugees,68 and stateless persons69 include
diverse but limited exceptions.  The limits are of three kinds:
(1) They are restricted to certain portions of the treaty; (2)
they may only apply if the national security threat is compel-
ling or linked to an emergency; or (3) they are conditioned
either procedurally or substantively.  For example, under the
convention dealing with migrant workers, two articles allow
the exception only if no other treaty rights are violated; an-
other article permits individuals to be expelled on national se-
curity grounds, but they must be informed of this action in a
language they can understand.70
Outside of the human rights area, the Comprehensive
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has a broad exception that allows an
inspected state to “take measures it deems necessary to protect
national security interests.”71  Under the International Con-
vention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Par-
ties cannot be required to supply information which would
“jeopardize the security of the State concerned . . . .”72  An
older treaty, the Convention and Statute on Freedom of
Transit, permits states to impose restrictions “in case of an
emergency affecting the safety of the State or the vital interests
67. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-
grant Workers and Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, at 261,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Dec. 18, 1990)
[hereinafter Migrant Workers Convention].
68. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 9, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T. 6223, 189 U.N.T.S. 150.
69. Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 9, Sept. 28,
1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117.  These treaties condition use of the national security
exception to “time of war or other grave and exceptional circumstances” and
only permit “provisional measures.”  For a further discussion of these trea-
ties, see infra Part III.F.
70. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 67.  Only six articles include R
national security exceptions with wording similar to the CRC. Id. arts. 8, 13,
22, 26, 39, 40.  Two articles require the national security exception to be
consistent with the other rights recognized in the Convention. Id. arts. 8, 39.
Article 22 requires that the decision to expel individuals be communicated
in a language these individuals can understand.  National security can be
invoked as an excuse for not giving reasons or for denying review, but only if
the national security concerns are “compelling.” Id. art. 22(3)-(4).
71. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty art. IV(57)(b), Sept. 24,
1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-28 (1997), 35 I.L.M. 1439.
72. International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Ter-
rorism art. 7, G.A. Res. 59/290, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/290 (Apr. 13, 2005).
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-2\NYI202.txt unknown Seq: 19 11-MAR-08 10:06
2008] TREATIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 455
of the country,” but this must be done only in “exceptional”
cases.  The principle of freedom of transit “must be observed
to the utmost possible extent.”73  Although the statute does
not prescribe rights and duties for belligerents, it is to “con-
tinue in force in time of war so far as such rights and duties
permit.”74
Of particular relevance to the interpretation of the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, the United Nations Convention
against Corruption has two very limited explicit national secur-
ity exceptions.  First, in the midst of a section promoting the
participation of civil society, the treaty states that information
dissemination may be restricted in order to protect national
security or public order.75  Second, a State Party can refuse to
provide mutual legal assistance if it considers that execution of
the request “is likely to prejudice sovereignty, security, ordre
public, or other essential interests.”76
Finally, a few treaties dealing with particularly egregious
violations of human rights explicitly rule out any national se-
curity exceptions.  The International Convention for the Pro-
tection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance asserts
73. Convention and Statute on Freedom of Transit art. 7, Apr. 20, 1921,
VII L.N.T.S. 29.  The Convention also permits contracting states to deny
transit to passengers whose entry is forbidden and to goods whose importa-
tion is prohibited on a number of grounds including “security.”  The transit
of arms can also be prohibited. Id. art. 5.
74. Id. art. 8.
75. United Nations Convention against Corruption art. 13(1)(d)(ii),
U.N. Doc. A/58/422 (Dec. 9, 2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004), available
at http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/convention_corruption/signing/Con-
vention-e.pdf (“Participation of society:  1. Each State Party shall take appro-
priate measures, within its means and in accordance with fundamental prin-
ciples of its domestic law, to promote the active participation of individuals
and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental
organizations and community-based organizations, in the prevention of and
the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness regarding the exis-
tence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by corruption.  This partici-
pation should be strengthened by such measures as: . . . [r]especting, pro-
moting and protecting the freedom to seek, receive, publish and dissemi-
nate information concerning corruption.  That freedom may be subject to
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided for by law
and are necessary . . . [f]or the protection of national security or ordre public
or of public health or morals.”).
76. Id. art. 46(21)(b).  The Council of Europe has a similar provision in
its treaty on corruption.  Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption art. 26(2), Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173.
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that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, “whether a
state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or
any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification
for enforced disappearance.”77  The Convention against Tor-
ture contains identical language.78  These provisions might be
read to suggest that the background against which treaties are
written includes an implicit exception for national security
that is overridden in a particular case.  However, as we argued
above, customary international law does not include an open-
ended background presumption, although it does include
other implicit exceptions, such as self-defense and necessity,
which have limited applicability in the national security area.
Thus, we read this language not as overcoming an implicit
background norm related to national security, but as empha-
sizing the reach of the treaty and preempting the narrow im-
plicit exceptions that do exist as they apply to war, threats of
war, and emergencies.  Treaties seldom include blanket state-
ments.  However, it is not uncommon for states to put national
security exceptions into implementing legislation, a practice
which the drafters of these treaties wished to avoid.
Given that neither customary international law nor the
language of other treaties spells out a broad, open-ended na-
tional security exemption, it seems clear that none can be read
into the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.  In the absence of
explicit language, State Parties are limited to accepted custom-
ary law exceptions covering emergencies and imminent
threats.
C. Prosecutorial Discretion
Against this background, the British government’s treat-
ment of the Al Yamamah corruption case appears to be incon-
sistent with its treaty obligations.  Nevertheless, the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention does grant signatory states a degree
of prosecutorial discretion.79  This opens up the possibility
77. International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from En-
forced Disappearance art. 1(2), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/WP.1/
REV.4 (Sept. 23, 2005).
78. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment art. 2(2), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
79. OECD Convention, supra note 1, art. 5; see also OECD, Commentaries
on the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery ¶ 27, http://www.oecd.
org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_201185_2048129_1_1_1_1,00.html (last
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that, despite the fact that the treaty does not allow for a na-
tional security exception, a prosecutor could be justified in
simply declining to prosecute in cases where national security
concerns are implicated.
Before coming to a final assessment of the U.K. govern-
ment’s conduct, we examine the relevant provision of the
treaty as well as the Official Commentary.  Article 5 of the
OECD Convention lists three factors that should not influence
prosecutors:  economic interest, interstate relations, and the
identity of those involved.  It continues:
Investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a for-
eign public official shall be subject to the applicable
rules and principles of each Party.  They shall not be
influenced by considerations of national economic
interest, the potential effect upon relations with an-
other State or the identity of the natural or legal per-
sons involved.80
The Official Commentary to the Convention states:
Article 5 recognises the fundamental nature of na-
tional regimes of prosecutorial discretion.  It
recognises as well that, in order to protect the inde-
pendence of prosecution, such discretion is to be ex-
ercised on the basis of professional motives and is not
to be subject to improper influence by concerns of a
political nature.81
Although it recognizes the “fundamental nature” of
prosecutorial discretion, the Commentary points out that such
discretion must go along with prosecutorial independence and
that this independence must be protected and not be subject
to improper influence.  However, “improper” in the Commen-
tary is not a self-defining term.  Of some help is the clause “by
concerns of a political nature”—influence by political con-
cerns is inherently improper.  The prohibition against political
influence is especially relevant to the British case because the
Serious Fraud Office is not independent and must obtain the
visited Oct. 11, 2007) [hereinafter OECD, Commentaries on the OECD Con-
vention].
80. OECD Convention, supra note 1, art. 5.
81. OECD, Commentaries on the OECD Convention, supra note 79, ¶ R
27.
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approval of the Attorney General, a member of the Cabinet, to
proceed with prosecutions.
However, the extent to which political concerns can be
differentiated from security or intelligence concerns is up for
debate.  “Political concerns” could be interpreted broadly to
include both domestic and international security concerns.  It
might also be interpreted narrowly to exclude pure security
concerns and include only domestic political factors related to
partisanship or the protection of the reputations of politicians
or the government.  However, returning to the text of article
5, interstate relations are expressly excluded from the con-
cerns that may properly influence investigations and prosecu-
tions of the bribery of a foreign public official.82  This pro-
scription seems to directly address the purported risk to Saudi
intelligence cooperation that the U.K. government cited as jus-
tification for quashing the BAE investigation.
Nevertheless, the British read article 5 as permitting them
to exercise prosecutorial discretion on “public interest”
grounds such as national security.  The British Code for Crown
Prosecutors explicitly invokes the “Shawcross Exercise,” requir-
ing that “the public interest” be a factor in determining
whether to go forward with a case.  The Code contains guide-
lines for making such judgments and states that a prosecution
is “less likely to be needed” under certain circumstances in-
cluding the possibility that “details may be made public that
could harm sources of information, international relations or
national security.”83  In quashing the BAE case, the Attorney
General attempted to justify his actions as just such an exercise
of discretion.84
The Vienna Convention requires Parties to exercise good
faith in carrying out treaty responsibilities and states that trea-
ties shall be interpreted in good faith—that is, in the light of
their underlying goals and principles.85  Because the primary
goal of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is to limit corrup-
tion in international business dealings, ambiguities surround-
82. OECD Convention, supra note 1, art. 5.
83. CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, CODE FOR CROWN PROSECUTORS, art. 5
(2004) (UK), available at http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/docs/code
2004english.pdf.
84. PARL. DEB., H.C. (Jan. 19, 2007) 1429W.
85. Vienna Convention, supra note 13, arts. 26, 31(1). R
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ing article 5 should be resolved in favor of vigorous enforce-
ment.  Given the United Kingdom’s accession to the OECD
Anti-Bribery Convention, public interest concerns militate in
favor of vigorous prosecution in good faith.  The three consid-
erations explicitly prohibited by article 5 of the Convention do
not authorize parties to invoke an implicit, open-ended na-
tional security exception as a justification for failing to prose-
cute.  Just because these three proscriptions are mentioned
does not imply that other factors, more destructive of the
treaty’s reach, are within the discretion of State Parties.  Of
course, national security concerns could enter into British
prosecutorial decisions through the customary international
law doctrines of reprisal, self-defense, and necessity.  However,
the United Kingdom did not invoke these doctrines, perhaps
because they appear inapplicable to the case of a lucrative de-
fense contract.  The action of the Attorney General therefore
puts at risk both the treaty’s purposes and the United King-
dom’s reputation as a responsible international actor.
Failure to prosecute such cases can adversely affect the
public interest and national and international security by en-
couraging a corruption-fueled arms race.86  Within the United
Kingdom, many critics of the decision argued that the phrase
“potential effect upon relations with another State” ruled out
exactly the kind of national security concerns raised by the
government.87  As Peter Cullen argues, national security argu-
ments based on defense or on “considerations of international
relations . . . clearly fall foul of the Article 5 prohibitions.”88
“National security” should not be used as a blanket excuse
for overlooking the corruption of political allies or for target-
ing the corruption of opponents.  Thus, although states retain
discretion in initiating and pursuing prosecutions, a broad
86. We are grateful to Michael Likosky for suggesting this point.  The
preamble to the UN Convention against Corruption lists one of the justifica-
tions for the Convention as concerns “about the seriousness of the problems
and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies . . . .”
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 75, at pmbl. ¶ 1. R
87. A particularly articulate expression of this critique is included in sev-
eral of the statements made in the debate in the House of Lords on Feb. 1,
2007. See 689 PARL. DEB., H. L. (5th ser.) (2007) 339-83.
88. Peter J. Cullen, Article 5:  Enforcement, in THE OECD CONVENTION ON
BRIBERY:  A COMMENTARY 289, 289-331 (Mark Pieth, Lucinda Low & Peter J.
Cullen eds., 2007).
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reading of the political concerns that should not influence
prosecutions is the only one consistent with the purpose of the
treaty.  Article 5 does not permit states to assert a national se-
curity interest as an overarching exception to their enforce-
ment strategy.89
That said, there is no international tribunal where those
who criticize the SFO’s decision can get a hearing.  Interpre-
tive issues that arise under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
must be taken up by the OECD itself, by domestic courts, by
civil society groups, and by scholars concerned with the integ-
rity and force of international law.  They ought not to be left
to government officials of State Parties who may only be trying
to advance the narrow interests of the states they represent or
to shore up the political position of their governments.
III. THE LIMITED NATURE OF EXPLICIT EXCEPTIONS
Explicit national security exceptions provide specific illus-
trations of the way that international law deals with security
concerns.  Those who disagree with our claim that no implicit
exception exists must articulate just what an implicit exception
would entail.  Explicit treaty terms and their interpretation by
courts and commentators serve as a guide.  Despite considera-
ble variation among treaties, explicit national security excep-
tions point to some general principles.
The most persuasive material comes from treaties where
the issue has received some detailed consideration.  Thus, we
begin with GATT, its close cousin NAFTA, the Rome Statute
establishing the ICC, the ICCPR, and the ECHR.  These trea-
ties incorporate subsets of the following principles:  a thresh-
old of harm requirement; a notice requirement; a reason-giv-
ing requirement; a narrow-tailoring requirement; and provi-
89. But see Cullen, supra note 88, at 325.  Cullen argues that “Article 5 R
may not prevent a very limited national security exception,” but he seriously
hedges this claim with procedural constraints that would require states to
deal with national security concerns without abandoning the prosecution
and to demonstrate a clear legal basis and to provide reasons.  As we will see
in Part III, infra, his preferred procedural constraints are similar to those
imposed in treaties with explicit national security exceptions and the limited
exception he advocates seems consistent with the customary international
law doctrines outlined in Part II.A supra.
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sions for review.90  The ICJ has interpreted national and
international security language in treaties and, unless the lan-
guage is explicit, has refused to view the clauses as ones whose
meaning is left to the parties.  Its own jurisprudence sets inter-
pretive limits, and in all cases, good faith acts as a background
constraint on the ability of states to interpret treaties as they
wish.
We next review the language in a number of other treaties
to document the pervasiveness of explicit exceptions.  Most of
the treaties in this second group do not have strong interna-
tional enforcement institutions, but they do demonstrate that
the exceptions are usually constrained so that State Parties do
not have completely free reign to apply them.  A few treaty
provisions are indeed open-ended, but they are not relevant in
formulating an implicit exception.  An implicit exception
would have to be based on the narrowest formulation actually
included in a valid treaty.  Any other view would read the lim-
ited exceptions out of treaties.
To see this, suppose the reverse—that is, that the back-
ground norm is an open-ended national security exception
whose meaning can be entirely determined by individual
states.  Treaties could then only narrow the background norm.
In that case, treaties would not include national security excep-
tions, but would only include clauses that limited their exer-
cise.  Treaties would state that parties cannot evoke national se-
curity as a reason for failing to comply with certain treaty obli-
gations.  With very few exceptions, this is not how treaties are
drafted.  Rather, national security enters as a reason to take an
exception to a treaty.
However, some argue that treaties are themselves a source
of customary international law, so that one can read a number
of treaties, compute the average provision on some issue, and
declare that to be customary law.  Such a strategy would under-
mine existing treaties that contain provisions that do not
match the average—both treaties that make no mention of the
issue and those that craft detailed provisions to suit their sub-
ject matter.
Whatever general principles help determine the overall
content of customary law, our examination of the concept of
90. NAFTA, supra note 57, art. 2005; GATT, supra note 56, Rome Statute, R
supra note 60, arts. 5, 24, 81-85, ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 4. R
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national security convinces us that it only enters customary law
through the narrow exceptions outlined in Part II.  Because
national security concerns are not obscure or unacknowledged
issues, they are likely to be considered in treaty drafting, not
simply overlooked.  We reason that states that want strong pro-
tections insist on their inclusion in the treaty language.  They
do not rely on customary law.  If the issue is not mentioned
explicitly, only the limited background norms of customary in-
ternational law apply.
A. GATT Article XXI
The GATT treaty includes a national security exception,
and several cases seek to articulate the meaning of the treaty
language.  Article XXI states:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed:
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any
information the disclosure of which it considers
contrary to its essential security interests; or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any
action which it considers necessary for the pro-
tection of its essential security interests
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the
materials from which they are derived;
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition
and implements of war and such traffic in
other goods and materials as is carried on
directly for the purpose of supplying a mili-
tary establishment;
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in
international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any
action in pursuance of its obligations under the
United Nations Charter for the maintenance of
international peace and security.91
This article has been a factor in five GATT disputes, and
these disputes have begun to establish a framework for its in-
terpretation.  Four of these cases reached panels; they consist
of an early post-World War II dispute involving trade between
the United States and Czechoslovakia, two cases concerning
91. GATT, supra note 56, art. XXI. R
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U.S. trade with Nicaragua, and a challenge to trade restrictions
imposed by the European Community (EC) on Yugoslavia.
The fifth dispute, which arose out of the Falklands War, did
not go to a GATT panel but nevertheless raises some impor-
tant issues.
In 1949, Czechoslovakia challenged a U.S. measure that
banned the export of certain products to Czechoslovakia on
national security grounds.  The panel rejected the Czechoslo-
vak complaint, with the panel members referring to the provi-
sions of article XXI in general terms.92  For example, one dele-
gate argued that “since the question clearly concerned Article
XXI, the United States action would seem to be justified be-
cause every country must have the last resort relating to its own
security.”93  Still, the specific provisions of the article were
mentioned.94  Furthermore, when Czechoslovakia charged
that the United States’ construction of the term “war material”
in article XXI(b)(ii) was too expansive, the U.S. delegate re-
sponded with a defense on the merits, arguing that the U.S.
export control regime was “highly selective.”95  Thus, dispu-
tants argued about whether the action of the United States fell
within the treaty clause.
We have already mentioned Nicaragua v. United States
(1984) (Nicaragua I) as a case demonstrating the exclusive na-
ture of the treaty language when a Party claims a national se-
curity exception.  In that case, Nicaragua challenged a Reagan
92. The vote was 17 for dismissal (including a U.S. panel member), 3
abstentions, 2 absent, and 1 affirmative vote (from the Czechoslovak mem-
ber).  Summary Record of the Twenty-Second Meeting, Request of the Govern-
ment of Czechoslovakia for a decision under Article XXIII, GATT/CP.3/SR.22, at 4-
9 (June 8, 1949) [hereinafter Article XXIII]; see also Hannes L. Schloemann
& Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the WTO:
National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 424, 433 (1999).
93. Article XXIII, supra note 92, at 7 (citing a statement from Mr. R
Shackle of the United Kingdom).
94. See id. at 5-9 (citing Mr. Herrera-Arando of Cuba as stating that article
XXI overrode article I, Mr. Augenthaler of Czechoslovakia arguing that the
United States had interpreted the expression “war material” too broadly, Mr.
Hasnie from Pakistan arguing that the case be decided under article XXI
alone, and Chairman Wilgress of Canada stating that the United States had
defended its actions under articles XX and XXI); Hahn, supra note 56, at R
570.
95. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 92, at 433; GATT, supra note 56, R
art. XXI.
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-2\NYI202.txt unknown Seq: 28 11-MAR-08 10:06
464 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 40:437
Administration policy that drastically reduced U.S. sugar im-
ports from Nicaragua.  The United States declined to invoke
article XXI and argued instead that its actions were beyond
the scope of GATT and hence beyond the panel’s jurisdiction.
The panel simply held the United States in violation of GATT
without examining the applicability of article XXI.  It did not
interpret the U.S. action as a valid exception to the treaty.96
The third case relating to article XXI, Nicaragua v. United
States (1985-1986) (Nicaragua II), was Nicaragua’s response to
a complete import and export embargo imposed by the
United States.97  This time, the United States invoked article
XXI but argued that its action was unreviewable by the panel
both by the clear terms of the article, which were “crafted spe-
cifically” to prohibit such review, and by the terms of reference
of the panel, which explicitly instructed the panel not to “ex-
amine or judge the validity of or motivation for the invocation
of Article XXI(b)(iii) by the United States.”98  Under the
GATT rules in force at that time, both parties had to agree on
the terms of reference ex ante, and the United States insisted
on these restricted terms.99
96. See Report of the Panel, United States—Imports of Sugar from Nicaragua,
¶¶ 2.3, 4.4-4.7, L/5607 (Mar. 13, 1984), GATT B.I.S.D. (31st Supp.) at 67, 74
(1984), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/ussu-
garnicaragua.pdf.
97. Report of the Panel, United States—Trade Measures Affecting Nicaragua
(Nicaragua II), L/6053 (Oct. 13, 1986), available at http://www.wto.org/
gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91240197.pdf.
98. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on
March 12, 1986, C/M/196, at 7-8 (1986).
99. Note that such a move is no longer possible, since the Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding established under the WTO does not require the con-
sent of the defendant to establish the terms of reference for a panel.  Under-
standing on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation, Annex 2, Legal Instrument—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].  The DSU has “taken care of the
three occasions on which, under the GATT, a party was able to block the
beginning of the panel process.”  Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Experience from the
WTO Appellate Body, 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 469, 471-72 (2003).  The defendant
cannot block establishment of a panel unless it can convince the General
Council of the WTO unanimously to decide not to establish a panel. Id.
Similarly, if the parties cannot agree to the selection of panelists, WTO offi-
cials can select the members. Id. art. 8.7.  Finally, if the parties cannot agree
on the terms of reference, the panel will use the standard terms of reference
in the DSU.  These standard terms are very general, stating that the panel
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The panel determined that it was limited by its terms of
reference not to examine the U.S. action, but it made clear
that, in general, panels could review invocations of article
XXI.100  In doing so, it drew on the well-established principle
of national and international law that provisions of treaties
must be interpreted in conjunction with other provisions in
the same treaty.101  Hence, national security exceptions must
be interpreted in light of other treaty provisions; they are not
mere reflections of a general limitation on treaties that is inde-
pendent of the explicit provisions in particular treaties.102
The content of a national security exception must come from
the treaty itself, and will be subject to review according to the
terms of the treaty.  Here, the panel observed that reading arti-
cle XXI in conjunction with the rest of the treaty favored re-
viewability of decisions under article XXI:
If it were accepted that the interpretation of Article
XXI was reserved entirely to the contracting party in-
voking it, how could the CONTRACTING PARTIES
ensure that this general exception to all obligations
under the General Agreement is not invoked exces-
sively or for purposes other than those set out in this
provision?  If the CONTRACTING PARTIES give a
panel the task of examining a case involving an Arti-
cle XXI invocation without authorizing it to examine
the justification of that invocation, do they limit the
adversely affected contracting party’s right to have its
complaint investigated in accordance with Article
XXIII:2?103
In 1991, in the fourth and most recent case, the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia challenged restrictions on
trade that the EC had imposed in response to the Yugoslav
will rule in light of the relevant provisions cited by the parties. Id. art. 7.
Ehlermann, a former member of the WTO’s Appellate Body that hears ap-
peals from panels, claims that the most important innovation introduced by
the DSU is “the transformation of the traditional, consensus-based dispute
settlement system into a compulsory, quasi-automatic system of adjudica-
tion.”  Ehlermann, supra, at 474.
100. See Report by the Panel, Nicaragua II, ¶ 5.17; see also Schloemann &
Ohlhoff, supra note 92, at 435. R
101. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 92, at 435. R
102. See id.
103. Nicaragua II, ¶ 5.17.
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civil war.  The EC explicitly grounded its action in article XXI.
Although panel proceedings were suspended in 1993 in light
of the uncertainty surrounding the status of the new Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), the Council
agreed to establish a panel to review the EC’s invocation of
article XXI, and the EC did not claim that such review was
barred.104
Finally, we mention one dispute that did not reach a
panel.  In 1982, in response to the attempted annexation of
the Falkland/Malvinas Islands by Argentina, the EC, Australia,
and Canada imposed trade restrictions on Argentina.  In a
contentious GATT Council meeting, these countries stated
that they “had taken certain measures on the basis of their in-
herent rights, of which Article XXI of the General Agreement
was a reflection.”105  However, they could not obtain unani-
mous support for this interpretation of article XXI, and many
delegates were concerned that recognizing Parties’ “inherent
rights” to define national security would give them carte
blanche to undermine the treaty.106  Instead, the Council is-
sued a “Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General
Agreement” that reads (in relevant part) as follows:
Considering that the exceptions envisaged in Article
XXI of the General Agreement constitute an impor-
tant element for safeguarding the rights of con-
tracting parties when they consider that reasons of se-
curity are involved;
104. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 92, at 436; see also Communica- R
tion from the European Communities, Trade Measures Taken by the European
Community against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, L/6948 (Dec. 2,
1991), available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/
91600060.pdf; Request for Consultations under Article XXIII:1 by Yugosla-
via, EEC—Trade Measures Taken for Non-Economic Reasons, DS27/1 (Jan. 13,
1992); Communication by Yugoslavia, EEC—Trade Measures Taken for Non-
economic Reasons: Recourse to Article XXIII:2 by Yugoslavia, DS27/2 (Feb. 10,
1992).
105. GATT Council, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on
May 7, 1982, C/M/157, at 10 (June 22, 1982), available at http://
www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/90440042.pdf; see also Communi-
cation by the Commission of the European Communities, Trade Restrictions
Affecting Argentina Applied for Non-economic Reasons, L/5319/Rev.1 (May 18,
1982).
106. See Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William Rappard on May 7,
1982, C/M/157, at 5-12.
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Noting that recourse to Article XXI could constitute,
in certain circumstances, an element of disruption
and uncertainty for international trade and affect
benefits accruing to contracting parties under the
General Agreement;
Recognizing that in taking action in terms of excep-
tions provided in Article XXI of the General Agree-
ment, contracting parties should take into considera-
tion the interests of third parties which may be af-
fected;
That until such time as the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES may decide to make a formal interpretation of
Article XXI it is appropriate to set procedural guide-
lines for its application;
The CONTRACTING PARTIES decide that:
1. Subject to the exception in Article XXI:a, con-
tracting parties should be informed to the fullest ex-
tent possible of trade measures taken under Article
XXI.
2. When action is taken under Article XXI, all contracting
parties affected by such action retain their full rights under
the General Agreement. . . .107
Hannes L. Schloemann and Stefan Ohlhoff propose that
the WTO regularize the process of invoking the national secur-
ity exception by allowing states to define their essential secur-
ity interests subject to review for good faith as required by the
Vienna Convention.108  In their view, the WTO should require
states to provide a substantive justification on the merits to
demonstrate such good faith.  This solution, they claim, bal-
ances sovereignty concerns, which require a state to be allowed
to define its own security interests, with the need to prevent
abuse.  Each of these competing concerns is central to the via-
bility of the treaty system.109
To summarize, no GATT panel has ever declared any part
of article XXI to be solely under the discretion of a State Party.
107. Decision Concerning Article XXI of the General Agreement, L/5426
(Dec. 2, 1982), GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.) at 23 (1983), available at http://
www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91000212.pdf (emphasis added).
108. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 92; see Vienna Convention, supra R
note 13, arts. 26, 31(1). R
109. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 92. R
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Even when a GATT panel has discussed the issue—for exam-
ple, in the Czechoslovakia case—an expansive concept of na-
tional security was not unanimously accepted, and the panel
members who supported an expansive reading of the article
were motivated by the desire to maintain the integrity of the
specific treaty system.110  Moreover, given the facts in the
Czechoslovakia case, the decision was arguably in line with the
text of article XXI.  A GATT panel might well have reached a
different result under a fact pattern that presented an obvious
violation of the text of the article.  When a party argued that
an explicit national security exception was unreviewable, the
panel suggested that exceptions should be read in the context
of the treaty in question and not as specific expressions of a
general principle that reserves questions of national security to
individual states.  In the most recent case, the party invoking
article XXI did not claim that the treaty barred review.  Al-
though there has been no WTO jurisprudence and no deci-
sion by a WTO body relating to article XXI,111 it is fair to as-
sume that arguments for reviewability of national security con-
cerns are even stronger now.112  The process has become more
judicialized, and disputes are to be resolved using “customary
rules of interpretation of public international law,” which in-
clude “good faith.”113
110. See id. at 433, 434 n.61.
111. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WTO ANALYTICAL INDEX:  GUIDE TO
WTO LAW AND PRACTICE (2007), available at http://www.wto.org/english/
res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_08_e.htm.
112. Schloemann & Ohlhoff, supra note 92, at 439-41 (“[T]he DSU [Dis- R
pute Settlement Understanding] itself is not subject to a national security
exception.  To the contrary, its Article 23 requires members, ‘[w]hen [they]
seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impair-
ment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the
attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, [to] have recourse
to, and abide by, the rules and procedures’ of the DSU. . . .  By not including
a provision excluding the application of the DSU to disputes in which one of
the members invokes the national security exceptions or a provision defin-
ing particular standards of review or any other particular rule applying to
the resolution of such disputes, the members presumably decided that such
disputes should not, in principle, be treated differently from other disputes
under the covered agreements.”).
113. Ehlermann, supra note 99, at 480; see Vienna Convention, supra note R
13, arts. 26, 31(1) (“Every treaty is binding upon the parties to it and must be R
performed by them in good faith. . . .  A treaty shall be interpreted in good
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B. North American Free Trade Agreement
NAFTA article 2102 contains an explicit national security
exception that is similar to the exception in GATT.114  Accord-
ing to the Statement of Administrative Action in the United
States’ NAFTA Implementation Act of 1993, this exception is
“self-judging” in nature but must be invoked in good faith:
Article 2102 governs the extent to which a govern-
ment may take action that would otherwise be incon-
sistent with the NAFTA in order to protect its essen-
tial security interests. . . . The national security exception
is self-judging in nature, although each government would
expect the provisions to be applied by the other in good
faith.115
The NAFTA dispute resolution procedures can be used to test
whether a given invocation of national security concerns satis-
fies the good faith requirement.116  Before resorting to formal
dispute resolution procedures, parties are encouraged to re-
solve their disagreements informally through cooperation and
consultation.117
In 1996 Canada initiated such a consultation in a chal-
lenge to the United States’ Helms-Burton Act, which punished
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
114. NAFTA, supra note 57, art. 2102 (“[N]othing in this Agreement shall R
be construed:  (a) to require any Party to furnish or allow access to any infor-
mation the disclosure of which it determines to be contrary to its essential
security interests; (b) to prevent any Party from taking any actions that it
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i)
relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to
such traffic and transactions in other goods, materials, services and technol-
ogy undertaken directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military
or other security establishment, (ii) taken in time of war or other emergency
in international relations, or (iii) relating to the implementation of national
policies or international agreements respecting the non-proliferation of nu-
clear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; or (c) to prevent any Party
from taking action in pursuance of its obligations under the United Nations
Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.”).
115. Legislative Line Item Veto Act of 1993, H.R. 159, 103d Cong. (1st
Sess. 1993) (emphasis added).
116. The dispute resolution procedures are laid out in Chapter 20: Institu-
tional Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures.  NAFTA, supra
note 57, ch. 20. R
117. See NAFTA, supra note 57, arts. 2003, 2004, 2006. R
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countries for trading with Cuba, but failed to pursue the mat-
ter further.118  Antonella Troia presents arguments for each
side and concludes that had the dispute reached a formal dis-
pute resolution, Canada would likely have won.119  Canada in-
stead introduced a resolution before the Organization of
American States (OAS) condemning the Act, which passed
over U.S. objections by a vote of thirty-three to one.120
Further evidence that article 2102 is not entirely self-judg-
ing appears in Chapter 11 of NAFTA dealing with invest-
ment.121  Article 1138 gives State Parties the freedom to re-
strict investments or acquisitions by other Parties and asserts
that such restrictions are not subject to NAFTA’s dispute settle-
ment provisions.  Article 1138 takes care to emphasize that,
whether or not other decisions taken under the national secur-
ity exception are reviewable, if the decision involves invest-
ment, the State Party’s decision is final.  Although there is no
case law on the issue, one commentary argues that “if the Par-
ties had agreed that Article 2102 were entirely self-judging, Ar-
ticle 1138 would not be necessary.”122
In short, the explicit security provision in NAFTA gives
parties considerable discretion in defining their national se-
curity interests.  But, as with the WTO, this discretion is subject
to a reviewable good faith requirement.  Outside the invest-
118. “Two rounds of NAFTA consultations were held in Washington in
April and May of 1996 and a NAFTA Commission meeting was held in late
June.”  Stephen J. Randall, A Not So Magnificent Obsession:  The United States,
Cuba, and Canada from Revolution to the Helms-Burton Law (19 Can.-Am. Pub.
Policy, Working Paper No. 36, 1998); Kristopher Moore, Cuba in the Wake of
NAFTA, 8 REVISTA MEXICANA DE ESTUDIOS CANADIANSES 145, 151 (2004),
available at http://amec.com.mx/downloads/num8_otono_2004.pdf (“Ca-
nada and Mexico did not, in the end, challenge Helms-Burton within the
framework of NAFTA . . . .”).
119. Antonella Troia, Note, The Helms-Burton Controversy:  An Examination
of Arguments that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of
1996 Violates U.S. Obligations under NAFTA, 23 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 603 (1997).
120. The resolution passed in June 1996 and was followed on August 23 by
a unanimous opinion of the Inter-American Judicial Committee that the
Helms-Burton Act did not conform to international law. See Peter McKenna,
Canada, the United States, and the Organization of American States, 29 AM. REV.
CAN. STUD. 473, 477 (1999).
121. NAFTA, supra note 57, ch. 11. R
122. MEG N. KINNEAR, ANDREA BJORKLUND & JOHN F. G. HANNAFORD, IN-
VESTMENT DISPUTES UNDER NAFTA:  AN ANNOTATED GUIDE TO NAFTA CHAP-
TER 11, 1138-6 (2006).
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ment area, NAFTA provides for formal dispute resolution,
consultation, and information-sharing.123
C. International Court of Justice: Nicaragua v. United States
Besides the GATT adjudications summarized above, the
most important source for case law on the meaning of national
security exceptions has been the ICJ and, in particular, its 1986
decision on the merits in Nicaragua v. United States.124  In 1984,
Nicaragua brought a case to the ICJ alleging that the United
States had violated its obligations under general international
law, the UN Charter, the OAS Charter, and the bilateral
United States-Nicaragua Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation (TFC).  The United States challenged the jurisdic-
tion of the Court, and when it lost that challenge, it decided
not to appear further.  The ICJ nevertheless proceeded to re-
solve the case on the merits in June 1986, holding in favor of
Nicaragua on a number of its claims.  The Court, finding that
it did not have the jurisdiction to apply multilateral treaties in
this case, decided the case on the basis of customary interna-
tional law and the TFC.125  It refused to allow the individual
states to have the final word in deciding the meaning of “self-
defense,” “collective self-defense,” “necessity,” and “propor-
tionality.”126  Especially important for our purposes is its treat-
ment of language in the TFC article XXI, paragraph 1(d):
The present Treaty shall not preclude the application
of measures: . . .
(d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a Party for
the maintenance or restoration of international
123. NAFTA includes these review mechanisms even though such formal
measures might be thought less important in a treaty with only three State
Parties, since the small number of Parties creates strong inherent incentives
for each to act in a manner consistent with their obligations.
124. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 I.C.J. 14
(June 27) (Merits).  For similar reasoning, see Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.),
2003 I.C.J. 161, 179-99 (Nov. 6) (Merits).
125. The UN Charter refers to customary international law, and custom-
ary international law is a free-standing body of law that “continues to exist
alongside treaty law.”  Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 94.
126. Id. at 102-04.
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peace and security, or necessary to protect its essen-
tial security interests . . . .127
The ICJ distinguished between the GATT language that
allows a Party to take actions it “considers necessary” and the
TFC that “speaks simply of ‘necessary’ measures, not those
considered by a party to be such.”128  The language of the
TFC, the Court asserted, gave it more interpretive leeway than
under GATT.129  In particular, the Court found that the
United States’ mining of Nicaraguan ports, direct attacks on
ports and oil installations, and imposition of a trade embargo
were not “necessary” to protect the essential security interests
of the United States.130
This judicial interpretation of treaty language demon-
strates how the specific wording of a treaty determines the way
interpretive discretion is allocated between a state and a tribu-
nal.  Some explicit exceptions are more open-ended than
others, and some treaties give tribunals more authority to eval-
uate state conduct as lawful or unlawful.  As demonstrated in
this case, when a court has authority to interpret a treaty, it will
not necessarily defer to the interpretations favored by State
Parties.  The GATT cases discussed above demonstrate that
even relatively open-ended treaty language will not prevent a
tribunal from peering into the conduct of states and measur-
ing that conduct against legal standards.
D. European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights has had numerous
opportunities to interpret the national security exceptions in
the European Convention on Human Rights.  These cases pro-
vide important illustrations of nuanced case-by-case analyses
that subject national laws and practice to detailed scrutiny.  As
we noted above, some rights included in the European Con-
vention have no national security exception, but others permit
exceptions so long as they are “prescribed by law and are nec-
127. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, U.S.-Nicar., art.
XXI(1), Jan. 21, 1956, 9 U.S.T. 449.
128. Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 116.
129. The Court used this discretion to find that some of the U.S. actions
were not “necessary.” Id. at 122-23, 141-42.
130. Id. at 141-42.
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essary in a democratic society.”131  Even when the Court finds
for the government in cases that implicate national security,
the justices scrutinize both the quality of national laws and
their application in practice.  They consider the processes
used by the state and the underlying substance of the claimed
exception.  The exceptions are not self-judging, and the Court
worries that broad exceptions will undermine the goals of the
Convention.  “National security” is not a talisman that gives
member countries carte blanche.
For example, consider an important early case, Klass v.
Germany, brought under article 8’s privacy protections.132  In
this case, the Court reviewed a German law permitting the
state to monitor private communications.  The German Fed-
eral Constitutional Court had already struck down one provi-
sion of the law, and the plaintiffs appealed to the European
Court of Human Rights with respect to the remaining portions
of the law.  Asserting that the interference with the right must
be narrowly interpreted, the justices went through a quite de-
tailed analysis to determine if the legislation and its implemen-
tation were “necessary in a democratic society.”133  They up-
held the statute but stated:
As concerns the fixing of the conditions under which
the system of surveillance is to be operated, the Court
points out that the domestic legislation enjoys a cer-
tain discretion. . . .  Nevertheless, the Court stresses
that this does not mean that the Contracting States
enjoy an unlimited discretion to subject persons
within their jurisdiction to secret surveillance.  The
Court, being aware of the danger such a law poses of
undermining or even destroying democracy on the
grounds of defending it, affirms that the Contracting
States may not, in the name of the struggle against
espionage and terrorism, adopt whatever measures
they deem appropriate.
131. ECHR, supra note 64, arts. 8(2), 9(2), 10(2), 11( 2). R
132. Klass et al. v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978), available at
http://www.legislationline.org//legislation.php?tid=46&lid=4871&less=
false.
133. ECHR, supra note 64, art. 8. R
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The Court must be satisfied that, whatever system of
surveillance is adopted, there exist adequate and ef-
fective guarantees against abuse.134
Subsequent cases, often finding domestic legislation and
state practice in violation of article 8 of the Convention, cite
this case and provide similarly careful reviews of both the for-
mal law and its implementation.135  An illustrative recent case
is Association for European Integration and Human Rights v. Bulga-
ria.136  Citing its own case law, the Court outlined a test for
whether a law interfering with the right of privacy was suffi-
ciently foreseeable and compatible with the rule of law to
stand scrutiny.  The criteria are clarity and precision:
To ensure the effective implementation of the above
principles [of clarity and precision], the Court has
developed the following minimum safeguards that
should be set out in statute law to avoid abuses:  the
nature of the offences which may give rise to an inter-
ception order; a definition of the categories of peo-
ple liable to have their communications monitored; a
limit on the duration of such monitoring; the proce-
dure to be followed for examining, using and storing
134. Klass et al. v. Germany, 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 49-50.
135. See, e.g., Moldovy v. Moldovia, App. No. 41827/02, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2007) ¶ 36, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=
1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Moldovy&sessionid=4805956&skin
=hudoc-en (holding that the Court must examine claim that a restriction is
“necessary in a democratic society”); Bartik v. Russia, App. No. 55565/00,
Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) ¶ 49, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/
view.asp?item=7&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Mikhaylovich&ses-
sionid=4805965&skin=hudoc-en (process inadequate); Volokhy v. Ukraine,
App. No. 23543/02, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006) ¶ 52, available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=Volokhy&sessionid=4805944&skin=hudoc-en (finding that there must
be safeguards against abuse to prevent surveillance from undermining de-
mocracy); Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 37 (2002) (Eur. Ct. H.R.)
¶ 123, available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&por-
tal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=Al-Nashif&sessionid=4805960&skin=
hudoc-en (noting that even when national security is at stake, rule of law
requires independent review).
136. Ass’n for Eur. Integration and Human Rights et al. v. Bulgaria, App.
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the data obtained; the precautions to be taken when
communicating the data to other parties; and the cir-
cumstances in which data obtained may or must be
erased or the records destroyed.137
The Court then went on to evaluate the Bulgarian law and
its implementation in terms of this list and found several viola-
tions of the Convention in the way the law was imple-
mented.138  The Court recognized that nation states must have
some discretion to determine when their national security is at
stake, but insisted on its own authority to judge whether excep-
tions have been carefully tailored to avoid undermining demo-
cratic and rule-of-law values.139
E. International Criminal Court
The Rome Statute for the ICC details the ways in which
State Parties must cooperate with the Court and the prosecu-
tor (articles 88–93).140  A national security exception only ap-
plies to the obligations listed under “other forms of coopera-
tion” (article 93) and then only with respect to “the produc-
tion of documents” or the “disclosure of evidence.”141  Article
93(4) states that “a State Party may deny a request for assis-
tance, in whole or in part, only if the request concerns the
production of any documents or disclosure of evidence which
relates to its national security.”142  This must be done in accor-
dance with article 72, which also protects national security in-
formation from disclosure and applies in the following circum-
stances:
(1) . . . in any case where the disclosure of the infor-
mation or documents of a State would, in the opin-
ion of that State, prejudice its national security inter-
ests.
(2) . . . when a person who has been requested to
give information or evidence has refused to do so or
has referred the matter to the State on the ground
that disclosure would prejudice the national security
137. Id., ¶ 76 (citations omitted).
138. Id., ¶¶ 78-94.
139. Id.
140. Rome Statute, supra note 60, arts. 88-93. R
141. Id. art. 93(4).
142. Id.
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interests of a State and the State concerned confirms
that it is of the opinion that disclosure would
prejudice its national security interests.143
Articles 93(5) and 93(6) condition a denial of assistance
in a similar way.  Articles 72, 93(5), and 93(6) have the same
goals:  to encourage a cooperative solution and to require a
state that invokes a national security exception to provide rea-
sons in most cases.144
The statute contains an explicit national security excep-
tion with respect to information disclosure.  It recognizes that
a state may seek an exception on grounds outside of the
treaty’s explicit national security exceptions, but it reserves the
right to order disclosure in such cases.  Paragraph 1 of article
72 contains the important phrase “in the opinion of that
State,” and paragraphs 2, 4, and 5 contain similar language.145
This gives the state a role in determining what information
prejudices its national security interests, but it does not imply
that application of the exception is entirely under its control.
Rather, if a state asserts that the disclosure of certain informa-
tion would undermine its national security interests, this will
activate article 72(5), which spells out how the state can re-
solve the matter cooperatively with the Court or the prosecu-
tor.146  If a cooperative agreement is not reached, the state is
obligated under article 72(6) to give “specific reasons” for
withholding the information unless the reasons themselves
would “necessarily . . . prejudice . . . the State’s national secur-
ity interests.”147  If the Court determines that the information
is necessary and relevant, other options are available.148  The
Court can request further consultations that may involve ex
143. Id. art. 72(1)-(2).
144. Id. arts. 72, 93(5)-(6).  Although the wording differs slightly between
articles 72 and 93(4)-(6), the differences are not material.  Furthermore,
even if the subject matter of article 93(4) differs from that covered by article
72(1)-(2), 93(4) is still meant to incorporate the procedures and protections
under article 72 for excepting to the subject matter of article 93.  The lan-
guage of 93(5) and (6) is similar to that of 72.  We demonstrate these points
in more depth in our memorandum for Transparency International.
145. Rome Statute, supra note 60, art. 72(1), (2), (4), (5). R
146. Id. art. 72(5).
147. Id. art. 72(6).
148. At the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, an “all-
star cast of American and English lawyers” carried out an oral argument that
simulated the prosecution of a head of state in front of the ICC.  The follow-
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parte or in camera hearings,149 refer the matter to the Assem-
bly of State Parties or the UN Security Council for resolu-
tion,150 or make factual inferences at the trial.151  If a state ref-
uses on other grounds not included in the treaty language, the
ing excerpt from the transcript nicely lays out the workings of article
72(7)(a):
Article 93 is then the Article to which we have to have some refer-
ence, for that is the ability of states to deny the provision of assis-
tance where matters concern, or rather, as the terminology of the
section is, relate to national security.  There are terms slightly dif-
ferent from that used as we shall see in Article 72, where the phrase
“prejudice its national security interests” is replied upon.
So going back to what I said in the beginning, an assumption that
people will work together is a first working step that states will be-
have honorably, if and when they decline to provide materials.  We
better have a quick look at the detail of Article 72 although, as His
Honor Judge Leigh correctly said, it is pretty complex and would
take a full five minutes to go through or more.  But what Article 72
and Article 73 does, in short form, is to recognize that the docu-
ments of the type required by any defendant or by a prosecutor for
the thing is mutual as between defense  and prosecution, may lie
with the interested party claiming prejudice, may lie with another
party.  The combination of Articles 73 and 72 effectively brings the
Court in, gives it jurisdiction, whenever a claim is made by either
that particular type of party, a party whose documents they are, or a
party into whose hands they have fallen.  We then see, very quickly,
that the first approach to the problem is to resolve it by cooperative
means.  Various means or methods of cooperation are referred to.
If, at that stage, by cooperation it is not solved, and if the Court
determines that the documents are relevant, then further orders
may be made under Article 72(7)(a).  As you can see, under Article
72(7)(a), where disclosure of the information is sought and na-
tional security has been invoked, the Court may request further
consultations and it may conclude that by invoking national secur-
ity “the requested State is not acting in accordance with its obliga-
tions.”  It may then refer the matter being the ultimate sanction to
the other State Parties or to the Security Council.  But in either
case, whether it makes that sort of order or whether it is simply
faced with the failure to disclose by some other party, appropriate
inferences may be drawn.”
Pieter H.F. Bekker & David Stoelting, The ICC Prosecutor v. President Medema:
Simulated Proceedings Before the International Criminal Court, 2 PEPP. DISP.
RESOL. L.J. 1, 38-39 (2002).
149. Rome Statute, supra note 60, art. 72(7)(a)(i). R
150. Id. arts. 72(7)(a)(ii), 87(7).
151. Id. art. 72(7)(a)(iii).
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court may order disclosure or draw appropriate inferences at
trial.152
The exact terms of the national security exception were a
source of concern for the United States, which ultimately re-
fused to accede to the ICC.  As former Ambassador-at-Large
for War Crimes Issues David Scheffer recounts:
Article 72 (Protection of national security informa-
tion) raised issues of particular concern to the
United States.  Our experience with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
showed that some sensitive information collected by
the U.S. Government could be made available as lead
evidence to the prosecutor, provided that detailed
procedures were strictly followed.  We applied years
of experience with the ICTY to the challenge of simi-
lar cooperation with a permanent court.  It was not
easy. . . .  Our view prevailed:  a national government
must have the right of final refusal if the request per-
tains to its national security pursuant to Article 93(4).
In the case of a government’s refusal, the court may
seek a remedy from the Assembly of States Parties or
the Security Council pursuant to Article 87(7).153
Ambassador Scheffer not only refers to the authority of
the Assembly of States Parties and the Security Council to re-
view invocations of the national security exception; he also
points to experience with the ICTY, another international tri-
bunal with even more authority to demand information from
state participants.  As the ICTY stated in Prosecutor v. Blaskic:
[T]o grant States a blanket right to withhold, for se-
curity purposes, documents necessary for trial might
jeopardise the very function of the International Tri-
bunal, and defeat its essential object and purpose. . . .
To admit that a State holding such documents may
unilaterally assert national security claims and refuse
to surrender those documents could lead to the stul-
tification of international criminal proceedings: . . .
152. Id. art. 72(7)(b)(i), (ii).
153. David J. Scheffer, Developments in International Criminal Law:  The
United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. INT’L. L. 12, 15-16
(1999).
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The very raison d’eˆtre of the International Tribunal
would then be undermined.154
William Bradford suggests that the ICC might decide to
follow this ICTY decision and also points to the availability of
review by the Security Council or the Assembly of States Par-
ties.  He argues that, were the United States a signatory, its un-
willingness to share sources and methods with the ICC “might
lead to a Security Council vote on whether the United States
has a duty to share national security information with potential
adversaries.”155
To summarize, the Rome Statute refuses to recognize an
implicit national security exception with regard to the disclo-
sure of information, and it establishes a process for exercising
the explicit exceptions included in the treaty.  Although the
court itself does not have the power to order the disclosure of
information when the state invokes the exception, the Assem-
bly of States Parties and the Security Council have power of
review.  Additionally, the court can request further consulta-
tions with the state and can draw inferences from any refusal
to provide information.  The drafters meant the national se-
curity exception to be bounded by a requirement to give rea-
sons and to be invoked as a prelude to efforts to achieve a
cooperative resolution.  The drafters did not include a blanket
exception because they recognized that the treaty might be
undermined if the exceptions were invoked too often and too
broadly as a way of denying information to the ICC.
F. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
allows State Parties to derogate from certain obligations under
extreme circumstances and forbids derogation altogether for
other provisions (article 4).156  Compliance with the ICCPR is
subject to review by the Human Rights Committee through re-
154. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-AR108, Judgment on the Re-
quest of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber
II, ¶ 65 (Oct. 29, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/
decision-e/71029JT3.html (quotations omitted).
155. William Bradford, Barbarians at the Gates:  A Post-September 11th Proposal
to Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 MISS. L.J. 639, 834 n.604 (2004).
156. ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 4. R
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ports that State Parties are required to submit at the Commit-
tee’s request.157
The General Comment on article 4 begins by acknowledg-
ing the importance of the article in balancing States’ need to
temporarily derogate from their obligations under the Cove-
nant and the need to prevent abuses of the derogation provi-
sions by establishing safeguards:
Article 4 of the Covenant is of paramount impor-
tance for the system of protection for human rights
under the Covenant.  On the one hand, it allows for a
State party unilaterally to derogate temporarily from
a part of its obligations under the Covenant.  On the
other hand, article 4 subjects both this very measure
of derogation, as well as its material consequences, to
a specific regime of safeguards.158
The article includes four categories of safeguards:  a threshold
of harm, a notice requirement, a requirement to give reasons,
and a narrow-tailoring requirement.
Threats to a State Party’s interests must exceed a high
threshold before derogation is possible.  Such threats must
constitute a “public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation.”159  The General Comment elaborates:
Not every disturbance or catastrophe qualifies as a
public emergency which threatens the life of the na-
tion, as required by article 4, paragraph 1. . . .  The
Covenant requires that even during an armed con-
flict measures derogating from the Covenant are al-
157. Id. art. 40(1)(b).  If a State Party recognizes the competence of the
Committee to receive and consider communications that claim that the
Party is not fulfilling its obligations under the treaty, it gets certain rights.  In
particular, it may submit such communications with respect to other States
Parties that have also recognized the competence of the Committee in this
respect.  Id. art. 41.  In addition, if a State Party to the ICCPR is also a party
to the First Optional Protocol, then the Committee can receive and consider
communications from individuals claiming to be the victims of violations of
any of the rights in the Covenant.  Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6
I.L.M. 383.
158. General Comment No. 29, States of Emergency (Article 4), ¶ 1,
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug. 31, 2001) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 29].
159. ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 4(1). R
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lowed only if and to the extent that the situation con-
stitutes a threat to the life of the nation.  If States Par-
ties consider invoking article 4 in other situations
than an armed conflict, they should carefully con-
sider the justification and why such a measure is nec-
essary and legitimate in the circumstances.160
The Committee has frequently criticized State Parties for dero-
gating from treaty provisions in situations that fail to meet this
threshold.161
The General Comment further states that a public emer-
gency is not sufficient to justify derogating from treaty obliga-
tions:  “Before a State moves to invoke article 4, two funda-
mental conditions must be met:  the situation must amount to
a public emergency which threatens the life of the nation, and
the State Party must have officially proclaimed a state of emer-
gency.”162  States must also “immediately inform the other
States Parties” of their intent to derogate “through the inter-
mediary of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.”163
The derogating party must specify “the provisions from which
it has derogated and . . . the reasons by which it was actu-
ated.”164
160. General Comment No. 29, supra note 158, ¶ 3. R
161. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of the Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Cove-
nant:  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR):  Comments of
the Human Rights Committee:  United Republic of Tanzania, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.12 (Dec. 28, 1992); ECOSOC, Human Rights Comm.,
ICCPR:  Dominican Republic, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.18 (May 5,
1993); ECOSOC, Human Rights Comm., ICCPR:  Uruguay, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.19 (May 5, 1993); ECOSOC, Human Rights Comm.,
ICCPR:  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 23, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.55 (July 27, 1995); ECOSOC, Human Rights Comm.,
ICCPR:  Peru, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.67 (July 25, 1996);
ECOSOC, Human Rights Comm., ICCPR:  Colombia, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.76 (May 3, 1997); ECOSOC, Human Rights Comm.,
ICCPR:  Bolivia, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.74 (May 5, 1997);
ECOSOC, Human Rights Comm., ICCPR:  Lebanon, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/
C/79/Add.78 (May 5, 1997); ECOSOC, Human Rights Comm., ICCPR:
Israel, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.93 (Aug. 18, 1998).
162. General Comment No. 29, supra note 158, ¶ 2. R
163. ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 4(3). R
164. Id.
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These notice and rationale requirements support both
the Committee’s official monitoring role as well as informal
monitoring by other Parties:
In paragraph 3 of article 4, States parties, when they
resort to their power of derogation under article 4,
commit themselves to a regime of international noti-
fication.  A State party availing itself of the right of
derogation must immediately inform the other States
parties, through the United Nations Secretary-Gen-
eral, of the provisions it has derogated from and of
the reasons for such measures.  Such notification is
essential not only for the discharge of the Commit-
tee’s functions, in particular in assessing whether the
measures taken by the State party were strictly re-
quired by the exigencies of the situation, but also to
permit other States parties to monitor compliance
with the provisions of the Covenant. . . .  [T]he Com-
mittee emphasizes that the notification by States par-
ties should include full information about the mea-
sures taken and a clear explanation of the reasons for
them, with full documentation attached regarding
their law.165
Hence, the Committee must determine whether the mea-
sures a State takes are narrowly tailored “to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation.”166  Further but-
tressing this narrow-tailoring requirement is the mandate that
such derogations be of an “exceptional and temporary nature”
as well as the directive that “[t]he restoration of a state of nor-
malcy where full respect for the Covenant can again be se-
cured must be the predominant objective of a State party dero-
gating from the Covenant.”167  Elaborating further on this nar-
row-tailoring requirement, the Committee observes:
A fundamental requirement for any measures dero-
gating from the Covenant, as set forth in article 4,
paragraph 1, is that such measures are limited to the
extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion. . . .  [T]he obligation to limit any derogations to
those strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
165. General Comment No. 29, supra note 158, ¶ 17. R
166. ICCPR, supra note 62, art. 4(1). R
167. General Comment No. 29, supra note 158, ¶¶ 1, 2. R
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-2\NYI202.txt unknown Seq: 47 11-MAR-08 10:06
2008] TREATIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 483
tion reflects the principle of proportionality which is
common to derogation and limitation powers.  More-
over, the mere fact that a permissible derogation
from a specific provision may, of itself, be justified by
the exigencies of the situation does not obviate the
requirement that specific measures taken pursuant to
the derogation must also be shown to be required by
the exigencies of the situation.  In practice, this will
ensure that no provision of the Covenant, however
validly derogated from will be entirely inapplicable to
the behaviour of a State party.168
Thus, similar to the Rome Statute establishing the ICC,
the ICCPR’s national security exception is limited both sub-
stantively and procedurally.  It only applies to some portions of
the treaty, it can only be invoked “temporarily” to deal with an
“emergency,” and it is subject to safeguards.  These safeguards
require the Party to provide notice and a statement of reasons
to other State Parties and to limit its actions to measures that
are narrowly tailored to fit the nature of the emergency.
G. Other Treaties
Many other treaties contain explicit national security ex-
ceptions that apply to part or all of the treaty.  These excep-
tions are defined in more or less expansive language, depend-
ing upon the treaty and the particular substantive issue.  As we
argued in Part II.B, the variety and limited applicability and
scope of explicit exceptions imply that no implicit national se-
curity exception ought to be read into a treaty that lacks such
provisions.169  In this Part, we return to these treaties to fur-
ther support our claim that even explicit exceptions are con-
strained by the text of the treaties in which they appear.  We
have already argued that point in some detail for GATT,
NAFTA, the ICC, and the ICCPR.  Here we simply point to the
limited nature of the exceptions in a broader range of treaties.
Typically, use of a national security exception must be
“provided by” or “prescribed by” or “in conformity with” the
law and be “necessary.”170  Some provisions limit necessary
168. Id. ¶ 4.
169. See supra Part II.B.
170. CRC, supra note 66, arts. 10, 13, 15; Migrant Workers Convention, R
supra note 67, arts. 8(1), 13(3) (constraining the exception as applied to R
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provisions to those “necessary in a democratic society.”171  Other
treaty language provides that national security can limit a
treaty’s provisions only in “exceptional circumstances,” for
“compelling reasons,” or “for as short a period as possible.”172
This language implies that the exception is not open-ended or
entirely up to the judgment of individual states.  If the treaty
contains any sort of enforcement or oversight mechanism,
those charged with that responsibility could rule that the use
of the exception was unlawful, not (democratically) necessary,
not justified by exceptional circumstances, or imposed for too
long.
Cases raising similar issues have arisen in the aftermath of
the 2002 Argentine economic crisis.  Argentina has bilateral
investment treaties with a number of countries that are sources
of foreign direct investment.  Most modern BITs permit an in-
vestor from one state to initiate arbitration against a host state
in the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes.  Argentina’s BIT with the United States
allows such arbitration, but it contains a national security ex-
ception.  Argentina, in cases brought against it, has argued
that the national security exception in that BIT includes eco-
nomic emergencies.173  The treaty language (article XI) is as
follows:
travel rights by stating that it must be used in a way that is consistent with
other rights in the Convention); Convention Relating to the Status of Refu-
gees, supra note 68, art. 9; United Nations Convention against Corruption, R
supra note 75, art. 13(d). R
171. See, e.g., CRC, supra note 66, art. 15 (emphasis added). R
172. Migrant Workers Convention, supra note 67, art. 22(3)-(4); Conven- R
tion Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 68, arts. 28(1), 32(2); R
Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 69, arts. R
28, (31)(2).  These treaties seem to equate war with “other grave and excep-
tional circumstances” and permit “provisional measures” in such cases.  Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 68, art. 9; Convention R
Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, supra note 69, art. 9; Convention R
and Statute on Freedom of Transit, supra note 73, art. 7 (requiring that the R
time be as short as possible).
173. The ICSID cases are:  CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina (U.S. v.
Arg.), ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/01/8 (May 12, 2005), 44 I.L.M.
1205, available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/CMS_Award.pdf;
LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentina (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID (W. Bank), Case No.
ARB/02/1 (Oct. 3, 2006), 46 I.L.M. 36, available at http://www.worldbank.
org/icsid/cases/pdf/09_LGE_Liability_e.pdf; Enron Corp. v. Argentina
(U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/01/3 (May 22, 2007), availa-
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This treaty shall not preclude the application by ei-
ther Party of measures necessary for the maintenance
of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with
respect to the maintenance or restoration of interna-
tional peace or security, or the protection of its own
essential security interests.174
Argentina argued that security interests can include eco-
nomic security, especially in times of crisis.175  In the CMS case,
the tribunal agreed that “essential security interests” could in-
clude major economic emergencies.176  It then investigated
whether article XI is self-judging, and concluded that it is not:
“When States intend to create for themselves a right to deter-
mine unilaterally the legitimacy of extraordinary measures im-
porting non-compliance with obligations assumed in a treaty,
they do so expressly.”177  Article XI of the BIT therefore gives
the tribunal scope to exercise judgment:
If the legitimacy of such measures is challenged
before an international tribunal, it is not for the State
in question but for the international jurisdiction to
determine whether the plea of necessity may exclude
wrongfulness.  It must also be noted that clauses deal-
ing with investments and commerce do not generally
affect security as much as military events do and,
therefore, would normally fall outside the scope of
such dramatic events.178
This holding is thus a particularly clear statement of the
limits imposed by explicit treaty terms and the unwillingness of
ble at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/Enron-Award.pdf.  In CMS and En-
ron, the ICSID tribunals denied Argentina’s evocation of necessity.  In LG&E
it approved the evocation of necessity.
174. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.- Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2.
175. CMS v. Argentina, 44 I.L.M. ¶ 352.
176. Id. ¶ 360; see also LG&E v. Argentina, 46 I.L.M. 36; Enron v. Argen-
tina, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/01/3. Although LG&E resolved the
issue for Argentina while CMS and Enron held that Argentina could not use
necessity as a defense, all three decisions held that the ICSID panel was em-
powered to evaluate Argentina’s use of the defense.
177. CMS v. Argentina, 44 I.L.M. ¶ 37.  The tribunal goes on to cite the
GATT as an example of an expressly self-judging provision, although we
have seen that even that case is not completely open-ended. Id.
178. Id. ¶ 373.
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a tribunal to imply that states can decide on their own when
and how to exercise even explicit exceptions.179  In line with
the narrow-tailoring requirement mentioned above, when a
state invokes necessity in derogating from the terms of a BIT,
it must prove a nexus between the actions it has taken and the
resolution of the crisis.180
A few treaties give more authority to states to determine
the meaning of the national security exception.  For example,
the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty says that “the in-
spected State Party shall have . . . [t]he right to take measures
it deems necessary to protect national security interests”.181
Similar language is now included in the 2004 U.S. Model BIT.
Article 18 states:  “Nothing in the treaty shall be construed:
1. to require a Party to furnish or allow access to any
information the disclosure of which it determines to
be contrary to its essential security interests; or
2. to preclude a Party from applying measures that it
considers necessary for fulfillment of its obligations
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of in-
ternational peace and security, or the protection of
its own security interests.182
Notice the shift in language between the Argentine-U.S.
BIT, which followed the U.S. Model BIT of the time, and the
179. See Reinisch, supra note 26 (comparing the holdings in CMS and R
LG&E).
180. The ILC Articles state that the measures taken invoking necessity
must be the “only way” to safeguard essential interests.  ILC Articles, supra
note 13, at 49 (art. 25(1)(a)).  Thus, it is not enough that the measures are a R
response to the crisis, there must also be no other less draconian means of
responding. See generally CMS v. Argentina, 44 I.L.M. ¶ 352; LG&E v. Argen-
tina, 46 I.L.M. 36; Enron v. Argentina, ICSID (W. Bank), Case No. ARB/01/
3; Reinisch, supra note 26 (discussing how tribunals divided on whether Ar- R
gentina’s actions met this test, with CMS and Enron finding that it did not
and LG&E finding that it did).
181. Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 71, art. R
IV(57)(b).
182. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and
the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Recipro-
cal Protection of Investment, art. 18, Nov. 2004, available at http://www.ustr.
gov/assets/Trade_Sectors/Investment/Model_BIT/asset_upload_file847_
6897.pdf [hereinafter 2004 U.S. Model BIT].
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2004 U.S. Model BIT.183  The latter permits the State Party to
determine what is necessary to serve its national security inter-
ests.  Unlike the earlier treaty, there is no mention of war or
emergency (“public order”), so the exception can apply in
peacetime if a state makes that determination.  This language
emphasizes the self-judging character of the national security
exception.  Even so, future disputes will test the limits of a
state’s freedom to decide for itself when its security is
threatened and whether its actions are a valid response.  For
example, suppose a state expropriates a shoe factory owned by
a foreign investor and defends its action in an ensuing arbitral
dispute by claiming that foreign investment in the shoe indus-
try raises national security concerns.  The aggrieved investor
will refer to the Vienna Convention to argue that the state did
not invoke the exception in good faith, a claim that would in-
evitably involve the arbitrators in defining the scope of the ex-
ception.184
The Third Geneva Convention, dealing with the treat-
ment of prisoners of war, includes explicit and limited clauses
that make exceptions for national security.185  The broadest
exception applies to Protecting Powers; that is, those charged
with protecting the interests of prisoners under the treaty.
These Powers are told not to “exceed their mission” and to
“take account of the imperative necessities of security of the
State wherein they carry out their duty.”  This gives the Detain-
ing Power leverage to limit the Protecting Powers’ operation,
but does not give complete freedom to the Detaining Power to
determine when the clause applies.  The treaty permits a few
more limited national security exceptions, only one of which is
self-judging in the sense of the U.S. Model BIT.  Thus, article
103 states that a prisoner awaiting judicial investigation can be
detained “if it is essential to do so in the interests of national
security.”186  Article 105 permits trials of detainees to be held
183. See id.; Protection of Investment Treaty, supra note 36, art. XI (“This R
Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures neces-
sary for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations
with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or se-
curity, or the Protection of its own essential security interests.”).
184. See Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 26. R
185. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 8, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
186. Id. art. 103.
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“in camera” but only “exceptionally . . . in the interest of State
security.”187  Finally, article 125 allows the Detaining Powers to
invoke “measures . . . [they] consider essential to ensure their
security” as a rationale for restricting visits and assistance from
representatives of aid and relief organizations.188  Thus, the
drafters of a treaty that is clearly designed to operate when
national security is at risk went to the trouble of clarifying just
when a Power can take national security into account.  They
did not leave it to the Detaining Power to make this judgment
entirely on its own.
In contrast, the Fourth Geneva Convention dealing with
the treatment of civilians contains broad national security ex-
ceptions in article 5 that apply both in the territory of a Party
and in occupied territory.189  In order for article 5 to apply,
the Party must be “satisfied” that the person in its territory is
“definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the
security of the State.”190  Such a person can be deprived of
rights guaranteed by the Convention.  Note that the Party is
given explicit authority to make this judgment.  In occupied
territory, those detained as spies or saboteurs or under suspi-
cion of hostile activity can forfeit their rights of communica-
tion if “absolute military security so requires.”191  The lan-
guage here is less clearly self-judging than when a Party is act-
ing within its own territory, but still gives considerable
discretion to the Occupying Power.
The difference between the two conventions is notewor-
thy.  The Third Convention has limited exceptions covering
specific aspects of the treaty; the Fourth includes blanket ex-
ceptions that the drafters included to avoid any presumption
against giving the Parties broad discretion.
We conclude that even those who would read some kind
of national security exception into all treaties cannot read in
an exception that is stronger than the weakest language in ex-
isting treaties.  It would undermine the development of inter-
national law as a system governing interstate relations for an
187. Id. art. 105.
188. Id. art. 125.
189. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 5(1), Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
190. Id.
191. Id. art. 5(2).
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implicit exception to be stronger than the weakest ones that
drafters actually have included in treaties.  The weakest excep-
tions are limited in two ways.  First, the measures taken must
be provided by law and must be limited to those that are neces-
sary.  Second, the circumstances must pass a threshold so that
they are considered compelling or exceptional.  The first limi-
tation constrains the type of measures, and the second con-
strains the range of circumstances.  Neither the measures em-
ployed nor the circumstances in which they are employed are
open-ended, and each limitation implies some outside judg-
ment or review of the exception’s application.  Invocation of
the provisions does not fall entirely to the discretion of the
State Party that asserts a national security interest.  In addition,
some treaties include procedural requirements, such as notice
or the giving of reasons.
IV. CONCLUSION
International law does not include an implicit, open-en-
ded national security exception that applies across all treaties.
There are three reasons why any such exception must derive
from the specific treaty in question.
First, there is a body of customary law that applies across
treaty contexts and that is codified in the Vienna Convention
and expressed in the ILC Articles.  This law does not include a
blanket national security exception, and the exceptions it does
include are reviewable.
Second, GATT, NAFTA, the Rome Statute for the ICC,
the ECHR, the ICCPR, and many other treaties contain ex-
plicit national security exceptions, belying the existence of a
strong inherent exception.  These explicit exceptions vary
both between treaties and within particular treaties with re-
spect to different provisions.  Many include important struc-
tural features.  Some describe thresholds that threats to na-
tional security interests must reach before a Party can legiti-
mately claim an exception.  For the ICCPR and the ECHR,
that threshold is high, in accordance with the fundamental
rights that these treaties protect.   For GATT and NAFTA, the
bar is set lower, likely because individual rights are not impli-
cated.  Still, a good faith requirement provides a backstop, as it
does for all treaties.  GATT, the Rome Statute, and the ICCPR
contain a notice requirement, and the Rome Statute and the
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ICCPR require that reasons be given.  Additionally, several
treaties require derogation measures to be narrowly tailored.
Under the ICCPR, measures must be “strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.”  The Rome Statute suggests spe-
cific measures that will both tailor derogation and promote co-
operation between the ICC and the Parties.  The case law
under the ECHR has created a similar narrow tailoring re-
quirement.  GATT and NAFTA also promote cooperation and
consultation between Parties to minimize the magnitude of
derogations.  Other treaties confirm the generally limited na-
ture of explicit national security exceptions but have fewer
procedural constraints.  Ultimately, the language of most trea-
ties does not imply that the exceptions are entirely open-
ended.  The few treaties that do seem to permit states uncon-
strained discretion only demonstrate the range of choices
available to drafters.
Third, several treaties include a means for review, and
such review has been exercised by GATT panels and the ICJ.
The European Court of Human Rights reviews both laws on
the books and their implementation according to substantive
and procedural criteria.  The ICCPR requires reports to the
Human Rights Committee and encourages peer review among
parties.  It also has an optional protocol through which indi-
viduals can bring complaints.  The GATT panel system has re-
viewed claims for exceptions based on national security
grounds, and that treaty’s dispute resolution mechanism has
been strengthened by the creation of the WTO.  NAFTA pro-
vides for consultation followed by dispute resolution between
the parties and also provides less formal, yet powerful, means
to encourage compliance through consultations and coopera-
tion.  The Rome Statute provides that the ICC, the Security
Council, and the Assembly of States Parties can review requests
for exceptions.
The case law, as articulated by GATT dispute resolution
panels and the ICJ, has rejected an inherent open-ended right
to take an exception to a treaty on national security grounds.
Although the GATT gives states the prerogative to define their
national security concerns, GATT panels can review whether
such concerns are expressed in good faith.  The ICJ, the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, and various ICSID panels also
assert the right to interpret both customary international law
and treaty language.  These cases show that when a treaty has a
\\server05\productn\N\NYI\40-2\NYI202.txt unknown Seq: 55 11-MAR-08 10:06
2008] TREATIES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 491
formal process of review, even permissive terms will raise justi-
fiable issues at least with respect to their good faith applica-
tion.
Even those who argue for an implicit national security ex-
ception in treaties cannot, we claim, legitimately go further
than the weakest explicit versions.  At most, therefore, propo-
nents of an implicit exception can only advance an exception
of relatively limited scope, especially in the context of an anti-
corruption treaty.  A broad exception can only be asserted by
those willing to accept the anomalous result that the best way
to be sure that national security interests are preserved is to
avoid any mention of them in the text of a treaty.
Our reason for this claim is as follows:  customary law in-
cludes a number of doctrines that are implicitly included in
treaties unless explicitly excluded.  Several of these doctrines
apply to certain kinds of national security concerns.  Thus,
those who wish to go beyond established doctrines need to ar-
ticulate grounds for their proposed extensions.  Unless such
commentators are willing to create a new national security
doctrine independent of the existing international law regime,
they must look to ratified treaties for guidance.  Because trea-
ties vary and because a broad, open-ended exception applied
by interested state parties would undermine much of the ex-
isting international regime, we argue that it cannot be de-
fended unless one is willing to accept these quite serious con-
sequences.  Defenders of the international law regime should
be very cautious about accepting arguments for broad implicit
exceptions that are not explicitly part of any bargained-for
agreements.
Our analysis brings to the forefront an inherent tension
between law and government discretion.  Treaties, by their na-
ture as legal instruments, curb governments’ discretion by
binding states to norms agreed upon by the Parties.  The treaty
regime accommodates this tension with escape valves that op-
erate both through customary international law that applies
across the board to all treaties and through the language of
individual treaties that allow derogations in specified circum-
stances.  These escape valves relieve some of the pressure on
states.   The exceptions help to maintain the treaty system both
by limiting violations (in that not every derogation need be a
violation) and by encouraging accession (in that states will be
more likely to sign a treaty if there are reasonable means to
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escape its requirements when circumstances so dictate).192
However, limits on these safety valves are equally necessary,
lest exceptions undermine the entire regime to the point that
it loses any semblance of law.  A broad, implicit national secur-
ity exception that applies to all treaties and that can be in-
voked and defined at the discretion of a Party would swallow
up the narrower escape valves—such as necessity, fundamental
change of circumstances, and self-defense—that have been ap-
plied as part of customary international law and would blow a
gaping hole in the treaty regime.  The very existence of trea-
ties implies that State Parties, by the act of acceding to them,
cannot legitimately claim to have complete discretion to com-
ply or not to comply with their obligations.  States cede some
autonomy when they accede to a treaty.
The alternative approach—that an explicit exception is
required to get around a claimed broad, implicit national se-
curity exception—implies that accession to a treaty without
such an explicit exception is almost a non-event because the
state in question retains virtually unlimited discretion to com-
ply or not to comply with the treaty’s terms.  Under this ap-
proach, only treaties with explicit national security exceptions
have any real force, and this force comes from the implied
192. Of course, nation states do explicitly violate treaties when political
pressures are too strong and no exception is available.  An important exam-
ple is the pressure imposed by the United States after the ICC was estab-
lished.  The United States urged countries to sign bilateral agreements
promising not to surrender U.S. citizens or employees to the court.  Refusal
to sign could jeopardize U.S. military aid to countries not on the exempt list.
As of August 2006, fifty-seven State Parties had refused to sign such agree-
ments and forty-three state parties had signed.  Judith Kelley, Who Keeps Com-
mitments and Why?:  The International Criminal Court and Bilateral Nonsurrender
Agreements, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 573, 574 (2007).  Although the United
States and some of the State Parties who signed these bilaterial agreements
tried to argue that the action did not violate the treaty, the general view,
even among signers of non-surrender agreements, was that the agreements
did violate the ICC. Id. at 576.  Kelley demonstrates that non-signers were, in
part, motivated by beliefs both in the moral value of the Court and in the
importance of keeping international commitments (pacta sunt servanda—
commitments must be observed).  States with high domestic rule of law
scores were especially likely to refuse to sign the bilateral agreements. Id. at
579-82.  Thus, a state such as the United Kingdom that is generally classed in
the high rule of law category is particularly eager to claim, as it did in quash-
ing the SFO investigation, that its actions are not treaty violations.
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revocation of national autonomy through a clause that on its
face purports to reserve some autonomy to State Parties.
To summarize, a state’s accession to a treaty implies that
the state is bound to the treaty’s terms, just as contractual obli-
gations follow from the consummation of a valid contract.  Ac-
cordingly, when states seek to reserve discretion that goes be-
yond the accepted principles of customary international law,
they must do so explicitly.  Two corollaries follow, both of
which arise in the case law dealing with such exceptions.  First,
explicit exceptions are to be read narrowly and according to
their terms.  The GATT cases discussed in Part III.A support
this proposition.  Second, when there is no explicit exception,
there is no exception except through the accepted principles
of customary international law.  This proposition was ex-
pressed most clearly in Nicaragua I under the GATT dispute
resolution system, discussed above in Parts II.B and III.A.
*****
Controversy over the U.K. Al Yamamah decision contin-
ues.  In March 2007, the Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development Working Group on Bribery reiterated
its serious concerns about the United Kingdom’s discontinu-
ance of the Al Yamamah investigation.  The Working Group
failed, however, to directly confront the status of the British
claim to a national security exception to the treaty.193  In the
United Kingdom, two nongovernmental organizations are
193. The Working Group on Bribery brings together all thirty-six coun-
tries that have ratified the Convention.  Its statement sidestepped direct con-
frontation with the national security issue by simply noting that the United
Kingdom “has stated that the discontinuance was based on national and in-
ternational security considerations” and then underlining that it is “in this
respect that bribery of foreign public officials is contrary to international
public policy and distorts international competitive conditions.”  OECD,
OECD to Conduct a Further Examination of UK Efforts Against Bribery,
Mar. 14, 2007, http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,2340,en_2649_2011
85_38251148_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).  Transparency In-
ternational submitted two letters to the OECD Legal Director before the
March meeting outlining its concerns about the British actions in the Al
Yamamah case as well as broader questions about its commitment to enforce
the treaty.  One of these letters included our memo, and both outlined the
arguments against reading a national security exception into the Conven-
tion.
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challenging the decision to terminate the investigation.194
One argument they make is that no implied national security
exception can be read into the treaty.  The plaintiffs assert that
if a public body announces that it will comply with an interna-
tional law obligation, domestic British courts can review subse-
quent decisions for compliance with that obligation.195  The
British High Court agreed with the plaintiffs and permitted
the plaintiffs’ challenge on the merits to go forward.196  There-
fore, our argument in this Article may face a judicial test.
More generally, because the treaty itself establishes no in-
ternational forum for formal challenges to a state’s enforce-
ment actions, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention’s ultimate
importance will depend upon efforts by the OECD and civil
society to highlight breaches by member states and to pressure
these states to take the goals of the treaty seriously in making
national prosecutorial decisions.197  Daniel K. Tarullo, in a re-
cent article on the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, points to
the Convention’s enforcement problems and recommends
that the OECD establish a committee of national prosecutors
to monitor the enforcement practices of signatory states.198
The aim of his proposal is to help prosecutors develop inde-
194. The groups are Corner House and the Campaign Against Arms
Trade (CAAT).  The progress of the lawsuit is detailed on the website of
CAAT.  Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), Developments Following
the Dropping of the SFO Investigation, http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/sfo/
sfo-latest.php (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).  On April 20, 2007 the plaintiffs
lodged their full grounds for judicial review.  The statement includes the
claim that no implicit national security exemption exists in the OECD Con-
vention.  Corner House Research v. Dir. of Serious Fraud Office, Detailed
Statement of Grounds, Q.B.D. Claim No. CO/1567/2007, ¶ 28, available at
http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/sfo/JR_grounds.pdf.
195. Corner House Research v. Dir. of Serious Fraud Office, Q.B.D. Claim
No. CO/1567/2007, ¶ 20.
196. The ruling was announced on November 9, 2007 with full judicial
review set for early 2008. See The Corner House, CAAT and The Corner
House Win Landmark Ruling on BAE-Saudi Corruption Case, http://
www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/item.shtml?x=558414 (last visited Jan. 20,
2008); see also Haroon Siddique, High Court to Review Halted BAE-Saudi Investi-
gation, GUARDIAN, Nov. 9, 2007.
197. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design:  Implementing the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 665 (2003-2004).
198. Id. at 701-708.  The committee would ensure both the “efficient ex-
changes of information pertaining to specific instances of bribery” and
“good faith investigation by home-country prosecutors of companies impli-
cated by such information.” Id. at 701.  Even if it is unable to push signato-
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pendent criteria for enforcement, share experiences, and criti-
cize weak or poorly targeted enforcement.  The committee
would give prosecutors leverage with their own governments
and promote their independence from domestic politics and
other internal pressures.  This seems a worthy proposal that
could help spur enforcement by member states in the absence
of stronger sanctioning devices.
Another response would be to amend the treaty to in-
clude an explicit and strictly limited national security excep-
tion.  Such an exception, should it be negotiated, ought to be
very narrowly tailored—even more narrowly tailored than
most existing treaty language.  As we noted above, the failure
to prosecute allegations of corruption can itself have national
security consequences.199  If a state’s multinational firms can
bribe with impunity in order to make sales of defense equip-
ment, they facilitate the accumulation of armaments by re-
gimes that may themselves be national security threats to their
neighbors and that may use their militaries to intimidate and
suppress their own populations.  The hope of large corrupt re-
turns can encourage rulers to buy large quantities of weapons
as a way to accumulate illicit wealth, and if their corrupt gains
can be safely stowed abroad, they may be tempted to use these
weapons offensively or against their own citizens, thus creating
the need for even more purchases in the future.
Even if the weapons are not actually used, a perception of
widespread corruption can destabilize regimes.  A study of cor-
ruption in the international arms trade cited several examples
of the impact of corruption on national and international se-
curity.200  According to the study, one factor prolonging the
civil war in Sri Lanka is the reluctance of politicians and offi-
cials to give up lucrative payoffs from arms deals.201  In An-
gola, the 1994 peace accords were undermined by corrupt
weapons deals.202  Corruption linked to defense spending has
been a source of grievance for opposition groups in Southeast
Asia, in Iran under the Shah, and in other countries.203  Weap-
ries to begin or maintain prosecutions, it may at least help bring interna-
tional pressure to bear with respect to individual cases. Id. at 706.
199. See Reinisch, supra note 26, at 66; supra Part II.C. R
200. COURTNEY, supra note 7, at 14. R
201. Id. at 11.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 14.
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ons sales can also backfire:  Western nations saw the weapons
they sold to Iraq in the 1980s turn against them in the first
Gulf War.204  As Lord Ahmed argued in a debate over the U.K.
Arms Export Bill:
The short-term approach of providing military equip-
ment or assistance to strategically important states ig-
nores the long-term implications of arming countries
in a region that is susceptible to change.205
Any potential national security amendment should not
give signatories a free pass just because a business deal involves
weapons or other national security products.  Most interna-
tional arms sales should come under the terms of the treaty.  If
they do not, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention will be unable
to help limit a type of corruption that undermines state stabil-
ity and produces security threats of its own.
To counter objections to the national security argument
for dropping the case, the U.K. Attorney General stated that
the case against BAE Systems was weak.  Others have sharply
questioned that conclusion.  The Serious Fraud Office in its
own press release did not refer to any weakness in the case,
indicating instead that “[i]t has been necessary to balance the
rule of law against the wider public interest.”206  This may be
standard language for U.K. prosecutors instructed to engage
in such balancing by their own Code for Crown Prosecutors.
However, in the context of an international treaty regime that
depends on the good faith efforts of member states, it sends a
disturbing message to those who see the control of corruption
as central to efforts to promote the rule of law and economic
and political development on a global scale.207  Upholding
treaty obligations and furthering cooperative international ef-
forts to control corruption must be part of that balancing pro-
cess in the United Kingdom and anywhere the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention is in force.
204. Id. at 20.
205. 630 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2002) 493, quoted in COURTNEY, supra
note 7, at 20. R
206. See SFO, supra note 3. R
207. To quote Judge Dionisio Anzilotti, dissenting in a case before the
PCIJ:  “It is clear that international law would be merely an empty phrase if it
is sufficient for a State to invoke public interest in order to evade the fulfill-
ment of its engagements.”  Oscar Chinn (Gr. Brit. v. Belg.), 1934 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A/B) No. 63, at 112 (Dec. 12) (separate opinion of Judge Anzilotti).
